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PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW IN AUSTRALIA:
FROM INDIVIDUALISM TO
COLLECTIVE LABOUR
RELATIONS?*
HAYDEN OPIE**
GRAHAM F. SMITH***
INTRODUCTION
There was a time when sport and the law barely interacted at all.1
Aside from happenings such as occasional prosecutions for violent or un-
ruly behaviour among players or spectators,2 claims for damages for per-
sonal injuries3 and even disputes pertaining to the affairs of the small
number of professional athletes,4 sport seemed reassuringly divorced from
the worldly and somewhat grubby realm of commercial and legal dealings.5
Indeed, in those idyllic days of amateurism, recourse by athletes to legal
* An earlier version of this paper was presented on 18 May 1991 to The Law of Professional
Team Sports Conference conducted by the Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Association
Inc. and The University of Melbourne Law School Continuing Education Program. A slightly
different version of this paper is published in (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law
Journal 313 under the title "The Withering of Individualism; Professional Team Sports and
Employment Law." This paper appears in the Marquette Sports Law Journal with the kind
permission of the former Journal. The authors acknowledge the assistance of Jane Ellis, law
student, The University of Melbourne, for assistance in collating footnote material for this paper.
** Faculty of Law, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, 3052, Australia.
*** Faculty of Law, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, 3052, and partner,
Clayton Utz, Solicitors and Attorneys, Melbourne, Australia.
1. The time we have principally in mind is the Victorian age in England - a period in which
much of modern sport has its foundations. For a broader consideration of the historical relation-
ship between sport and law, see G.M. Kelly, The Sport Revolution and the Legitimation of Sports
Law, 1(1) ANZSLA NEvSLETrER 6 (1991).
2. E.g., R. v. Moore 14 T.L.R. 229 (1898) (soccer player committed a foul charge on oppo-
nent causing his death - convicted of manslaughter), Rex v. Billingham, Savage & Skinner, 2 Car.
& P. 234 (1825), 172 E.R. 106 (spectators at a prize-fight convicted of rioting when a magistrate
tried to prevent the fight taking place).
3. E.g., Cleghorn v. Oldham, 43 T.L.R. 465 (1927) (caddy struck by careless swing of golf
club), Gibbs v. Barking Corporation, [1936] 1 All E.R. 115 (negligent failure by instructor to
provide assistance to student vaulting over "horse" in gymnastics class), Watson v. South Austra-
lian Trotting Club, Inc., [1938] S.A.S.R. 94 (occupier of trotting track not liable to rider injured in
unusual fall occurring when running railing became dislodged).
4. E.g., McLaughlin v. Darcy, 18 N.S.W. St.R. 585 (1918).
5. Other instances of interaction between law and sport can be readily identified, such as
disputes over sport-related gambling debts and challenges to disciplinary action. See also Kelly,
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remedies was rarely countenanced. When recourse was taken, such moves
were regarded as ungentlemanly and outside the bounds of acceptable con-
duct. Legal intervention could only sully the purity of sport. Sport was the
antithesis of work whereas law was, and still is, inextricably part of the
structure of employment and industry.
A microcosm of this divergence of sport and law was found in the ethos
of team sports on the one hand and, on the other, the growth of interest in
legal circles about promoting free economic competition.
The sports ethos originating in the Victorian era is well-known for ideas
of fair play, "sportsmanship," acceptance of the decisions of umpires, gra-
ciousness in defeat, humility in victory and playing the game for its own
sake - not for reward. The operation of certain strands of this ethos in
team sports, however, is not as well recognized. There is a strong element
of subordination of the individual's interests to the collective interests of the
team and, sometimes, the sport. This is found in notions that non-selection
for the team must be unquestioningly accepted, "unselfish" play is praise-
worthy and a club is entitled indefinitely to unswerving loyalty and service
from its players. (The latter notion has provided much of the early philo-
sophical basis for rules allocating players to clubs and controlling their
movement between clubs.) Significant also are the notoriously vague disci-
plinary rules requiring that players not act "contrary to the interests of the
game or bring it into disrepute."
Against the background of subordination of individual autonomy and
interests in team sports, the law of contract was evolving important and
vigorous principles about freedom of contract and the right of the individ-
ual to be free from unreasonable restraints on trade. Of course, as long as
the law and the world of sport pursued their separate paths, the ethos of
subordination and the principle of economic freedom did not collide.
The catalysts changing this curious stand-off were related to develop-
ments in professionalism among athletes and the commercialisation of sport
in Australia over the past 30 or so years. Hitherto amateur athletes became
professional, or at least semi-professional, and at the same time valuable
"assets" for their teams. Television and advertising revenues permitted, or
were required to finance (depending on one's view), payments to the newly
professional athletes sought by administrators seeking to build successful
teams. With substantial financial interests as well as the ambitions of ath-
letes and clubs at stake, the law of contract and related doctrines at last had
a basis on which to take a role. After a lag (the reasons for which will be
supra note 1, at 6, Hayden Opie; 'See You in Courtl'Recent Developments in Marketing; Selection
and Disciplinary Disputes, 7(1) SPORTING TRADITIONS 75 (1990).
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discussed below), a collision ensued. The law was used as a tool to promote
the individual interests of players against the collective interests of teams
and governing sports associations. It was fundamental in freeing profes-
sional athletes and, quite significantly, their clubs from many restrictive em-
ployment practices. The beginning of this new era in Anglo-Australian law
was the 1963 decision in Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd.
We maintain that until very recent times this new individualism had
been gaining ascendancy but the law has now begun to give greater weight
to the collective interests of team sports.' At the same time, collective la-
bour relations law is emerging within team sports in Australia. We will
demonstrate that both of these developments are leading to a "withering" of
individualism. Caution restrains us from pronouncing it dead.
Before we examine these developments in greater detail, it is important
to reflect upon the process of legal change and note that the law in its inter-
action with sport has lagged behind its interaction with other commercial
aspects of our society. This is apart from the reluctance of the participants
themselves to utilise the legal process. One cause of the initial non-in-
terventionist approach of the law in team sports is what we denote as the
"sports mystique." While professional team sports had become significant
commercial enterprises through the 1960s (if not earlier), this reality was
not reflected in the social consciousness. Thus, judges and lawyers were
reluctant to perceive sport and athletes in commercial terms like working in
a factory, building a house, farming wheat, staging a ballet or being a pro-
fessional entertainer. The other feature of the process of legal change need-
ing emphasis is that when lawyers view an aspect of social intercourse as
essentially private or domestic in nature, there is a tendency to move very
cautiously into that field.8 In this sense, there are distinct similarities in
how the law has moved at a snail's pace to govern de facto relationships9
and to govern sporting relationships. We may call this feature the "natural
caution of the law."
These two features are particularly striking upon examination of specific
issues in sports law. For instance, lawyers have been loathe to categorise
athletes as employees, seeing them instead as amateurs or independent con-
6. 1 Ch. 413 (1964).
7. See Buckenara v. Hawthorn Football Club Ltd., [1988] V.R. 39 and Hawthorn Football
Club Ltd. v. Harding, [1988] V.R. 49. For reasons which we will explain below, we do not regard
the recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Adamson v. New South
Wales Rugby League Ltd., 31 F.C.R. 242 (1991) (special leave to appeal to the High Court of
Australia refused 24 October 1991) as being inconsistent with our overall thesis.
8. E.g., Cameron v. Hogan, 51 C.L.R. 358 (1934).
9. See Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 2 N.S.W.L.R. 406, 412-15 (1985) (Kirby P).
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tractors. Sport is not "work." Comradeship on the field has not been trans-
lated into a collective antipathy by the players toward their employers.
These factors, together with the sports mystique and the natural caution of
the law, have kept sport outside the mainstream of the institutional indus-
trial relations system. In 1956, for instance, the Federal Industrial Regis-
trar decided that a predecessor to the Australian Football League Players'
Association was ineligible to register as a federal union. The decision was
based on a finding that the players could not engage in an "industrial dis-
pute" because there was no "industry" of playing Australian Rules football.
(The existence of an industry is a necessary precondition to registration.)
This finding seems to have rested on a view that the playing of sport - even
for remuneration - was not in itself industrial activity.1"
It is remarkable how attitudes have changed. Most professional team
sports in Australia11 are now entering the realm of collective labour rela-
tions law, just as they entered the realm of individual employment law sev-
eral decades ago. Recently, we have witnessed a growing professionalism
among the various players' associations. Even in cases where those associa-
10. 84 C.A.R. 675 (1956). The reasons why the playing of sport needed to be "industrial" in
nature are explained towards the end of this paper, but in essence the requirement stems from the
framing of the labour power in the Australian Constitution.
11. A wide range of team sports is played professionally or semi-professionally in Australia.
Traditionally, the two main winter sports have been Australian Rules football and rugby league.
The former dominated in the States of Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania
and the latter in New South Wales and Queensland. Separate leagues existed for each State and
on the whole were based in the State capital. For instance, the Victorian Football League con-
sisted of 12 teams, 11 based in the State capital, Melbourne, and one in the largest Victorian
regional centre, Geelong. Contests between States and between league premiers occurred occa-
sionally. Recently, the Victorian Football League has developed into a national league with teams
in all State capital cities except Tasmania and is now known as the Australian Football League.
Its following is not strong in New South Wales and Queensland and the preponderance of teams
are located in Melbourne. The old leagues in each State have been relegated to the status of minor
leagues. The New South Wales Rugby League has become a semi-national league with teams in
New South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. Soccer developed as a major
sport in Australia as a result of post-World War II immigration and there is a National Soccer
League. At times its growth has been restricted by ethnic rivalries and the loss of its best players
to European teams. It plays a summer fixture to avoid competition with the other football codes.
Basketball has emerged as a popular winter sport over the past decade and a men's National
Basketball League has the widest geographic coverage of any national sports league in Australia.
A women's semi-professional basketball league has a smaller following and geographic spread and
is likely to be challenged by the very popular netball which is developing a national competition.
Cricket is the dominant summer team sport. It is played professionally at international and
interstate levels with separate minor league competitions in each State capital city. A very recent
development is a small semi-professional baseball league called the Australian Baseball League.
Major amateur team sports include field hockey, softball and rugby union.
With the exception of basketball, most professional Australian sports teams are community
based and not privately owned.
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tions have not formally entered the collective industrial relations law sys-
tem, the mere threat has induced employers to recognise players'
associations for the purposes of private collective bargaining.
What is driving this trend? It is almost too trite to say that the growing
commercialisation of sport is doing this. Players are increasingly engaged
only in their sport - it is their livelihood - and, not unnaturally, they
wish to maximise the financial returns for their labours. On the other hand,
the clubs and the sports associations need to contain their largest costs -
wages. Hence, individual rights and interests must give way to the collec-
tive, commercial interests of the players and the clubs as in many other
areas of commercial life. Collective bargaining is a natural consequence of
these developments. The history of industrial relations shows that in mar-
ket economies, where groups of workers within an organisation perform
similar functions, collective organisation and negotiation will inevitably
arise. It is perhaps surprising that it has taken so long for team sports to
integrate into our society's entrenched traditions of union organisation and
established systems of industrial relations law.12
The employment relationship is the springboard for the study of profes-
sional team sports law. In examining the withering of individualism in this
relationship, our focus will be on the place of the athlete within the frame-
work of legal regulation which exists and on trends towards recognition of
collective interests. Our analysis will be divided into three parts. Part one
will examine the individual legal rights and interests of athletes. This sec-
tion will mainly be confined to analysis of common law rights.13 The sec-
ond part will consider the intervention of statute upon common law rights
and, in particular, how these provisions bolster the individual rights of play-
ers. Part three will consider the scope and role of collective labour relations
law in relation to professional team sports - in particular, whether we are
witnessing the end of individual contracting in this field and the scope for
enterprise bargaining.
12. See H.B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, 29 HARVARD L. REV. 13 (1915);
32 HARVARD L. REV. 189 (1919).
13. The focus of this analysis is on the content of the contract of employment. Issues con-
cerning the termination of such contracts in team sports are beyond the scope of this paper,
though good general accounts are to be found in JAMES J. MACKEN, GREG MCCARRY &
CAROLYN SAPPIDEEN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT (3rd ed. 1990) and BREEN CREIGHTON &
ANDREW STEWART, LABOUR LAW - AN INTRODUCTION (1990).
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I. INDIVIDUAL LEGAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
An initial issue concerns whether sport and work 4 are incompatible in
the sense that even though an athlete might be remunerated for playing
sport, he or she is not "at work." One "plays" sport - the implication
being that sport is something one does when not working. In this respect
any remuneration from sport is incidental."5 Such has been the prevailing
view. However, German sociologist Bero Rigauer has argued that elite
sport has become a form of work in the adoption of work's regimented
practices, terminology, organisational structures and aspirations. 6 Compe-
tition, specialisation, achievement orientation and quantification, "scien-
tific" approaches to improving performance and upward social mobility
through success are common elements of both elite sport and modern forms
of work. While not without its critics, 7 Rigauer's work demonstrates that
elite sport should no longer be regarded as fundamentally different from
work.
This philosophical issue has been often linked to the distinctly legal
question of whether a person engaged to play sport is capable of being em-
ployed under a contract of employment or some other legal arrangement.
We said in our introduction that courts have been reluctant to find that paid
athletes are engaged as employees. An illustration of this in Australia is the
decision of Justice Hardie in Elford v. Buckley. 8 Justice Hardie concluded
that, having regard to the essentially voluntary nature of the New South
Wales Rugby Football League19 at the time, the rules of the League which
bound clubs in the League regarding the transfer of players did "not fall
within the category of employment contracts.., appropriate for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of restraint of trade."2° In essence, Justice Hardie
held that a professional rugby league footballer was not really an employee.
14. In the sense of an occupation or activity from which a person derives a living in whole or
part.
15. This receives some support from the part-time nature of most Australian professional
team sports.
16. BERO RIGAUER, SPORT AND WORK (1969, English translation 1981).
17. E.g., Bob Stewart, The Nature of Sport Under Capitalism and its Relationship to the Capi-
talist Labour Process, 6 SPORTING TRADIONS 43 (1989).
18. 2 N.S.W.R. 170 (1969).
19. New South Wales is an Australian State. Australia, like the United States of America, is
a federation consisting of the federal government, six States (New South Wales, Victoria, Queen-
sland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania) and several Territories.
20. Elford, 2 N.S.W.R. at 177-78.
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This case, however, was one which involved an attack upon the collec-
tive interests of the sport of rugby league in New South Wales.21 It is inter-
esting to speculate on how courts may come to different conclusions in
different contexts. In a 1909 case in England, the Court of Appeal held that
an English professional soccer player was an employee.22 The case focused
on the right of the player to claim workers' compensation for an injury
suffered during a soccer match. The court seemed to have little difficulty
concluding that the player was an employee. According to Lord Justice
Farwell:
It may be sport to the amateur, but to a man who is paid for it and
makes his living thereby it is his work. I cannot assent to the propo-
sition that sport and work are mutually exclusive terms, or hold that
the man that is employed and paid to assist in something that is
known as sport is, therefore, necessarily excluded from the definition
of workman within the meaning of the Act. I put during the argu-
ment the case of the huntsmen and whips of a pack of hounds. The
rest of the field ride for their own amusement, but the three I have
mentioned are employed by and obey the orders of the master, and
risk their necks, not entirely for their own amusement, but because
they are paid to do it.23
One wonders whether the Court of Appeal would have come to the same
conclusion if the sport concerned had been cricket. At that time, soccer
was largely a working class game.24
Nevertheless, in a manner consistent with Rigauer's perception of elite
sport, Buckley v. Tutty25 put the status of professional team athletes beyond
doubt. The High Court of Australia26 expressly overturned the decision of
Justice Hardie in Elford v. Buckley stating that "the fact that football is a
sport does not mean that a man paid to play football is not engaged in
employment."27 After quoting Lord Justice Farwell in Walker, the High
Court added, "the position of a professional footballer vis-A-vis his club is
that of employer and employee. "28
21. In the sense that it was alleged that the retention and transfer rules were in restraint of
trade.
22. Walker v. The Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd., [1910] 1 K.B. 87.
23. Id. at 93-94.
24. See also Seymour v. Reed, [1927] A.C. 554 and Corbett v. Duff, [1941] 1 K.B. 730.
25. 125 C.L.R. 353 (1971) (Austl.)
26. The High Court of Australia is Australia's supreme court. State Supreme Courts and the
Federal Court of Australia stand below the High Court in the court hierachy.
27. 125 C.L.R. at 372.
28. Id. The Court relied for this proposition on Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v. Mad-
dalena, 45 A.L.J.R. 426 (1971).
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While Buckley v. Tutty held that in a general sense professional team
athletes are employees, it is useful to consider whether this will always be
the case. There may be advantages for both players and clubs in categoris-
ing players as independent contractors. It is almost impossible for a profes-
sional team athlete to escape categorisation as an employee, at least in
respect to sporting activities,29 due to the nature and application of the legal
tests distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.
The approach of the Australian courts now is to consider the facts of the
relationship against a range of indicia. The most important indicium con-
cerns the extent of the employer's right to control the work performed
under the contract. Other indicia include the following: the mode of remu-
neration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to
work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction or other-
wise of income tax and the scope for delegation of work by the putative
employee.30
However, the most important indicium is clearly the right to control.
The greater the right to control the work, the more likely it is that the
relationship is one of employer and employee. The emphasis on the right to
control, rather than the mere exercise of it, derives from a decision of the
High Court. The decision, Zuis v. Wirth Bros. ,31 concerned whether skilled
acrobats, engaged by an itinerant circus for an indefinite period at an agreed
weekly sum to give an acrobatic display on the trapeze at each performance,
were employees. An afirmative answer meant they were entitled to work-
ers' compensation. The putative employers argued that since they did not
exercise any control over the manner of performance of the acrobatic dis-
play, the control test was not satisfied. However, in a joint judgment, Chief
Justice Dixon, and Justices Williams, Webb and Taylor held that the acro-
bats were engaged under contracts of employment because "what matters is
[that there is] lawful authority to command so far as there is scope for it."'32
The Court recognised that in the case of skilled employment, employers will
rarely direct workers in the actual performance of those skills. Indeed, it
may be impossible to do so. Nevertheless, a right to ultimately control the
29. It is of course possible for an athlete to be an employee for certain purposes and an
independent contractor for other purposes. For instance, the athlete may be employed to play
football, but be engaged as an independent contractor to perform promotional activities for the
club.
30. Stevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling Co. Pty. Ltd., 160 C.L.R. 16, 24 (1986) (Mason J.,
dissenting).
31. 93 C.L.R. 561 (1955) (Austl.).
32. Id. at 571.
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manner of performance will be indicative of a contract of employment
rather than a contract for services.
The express terms of professional team athletes' contracts usually in-
clude promises to play the sport whenever and wherever directed by the
club, attend training sessions and carry out instructions of the coach. These
terms put the issue of employment beyond doubt. Even if such things are
not reflected in express terms, it is impossible to envisage professional team
sports being played without them. They clearly would be implied terms in
the contract.
Categorisation as an employee cannot be avoided simply by expressing
the contract to be one between principal and independent contractor. In
Cam & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. Sargent,33 the High Court of Australia looked
behind such an express term and decided that the nature of the relationship
was one of employer and. employee.34
Accordingly, other than in exceptional circumstances,35 professional
team athletes will be employees rather than independent contractors.36 The
categorisation of the professional team athlete as an employee, pursuant to
a contract of employment, has a number of implications for athlete and
sports club. Some are advantageous to one or the other of them, some are
not.
33. 14 A.L.J.R. 162 (1940).
34. See also Narich v. Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax, (NSW), 50 A.L.R. 417 (1983).
35. In Hughes v. Western Australian Cricket Ass'n (Inc.), 19 F.C.R. 10 (1986), Toohey J.
held the relationship between Perth district cricket club, Subiaco Floreat, (a minor league club
playing in a league conducted entirely in Perth, Western Australia) and former Australian cricket
captain, Kim Hughes, to be one of principal and independent contractor. Under his contract with
the club, Hughes was not obliged to play in any particular match and he was paid on the basis of
$1.00 per run scored and $50.00 per win.
36. See also Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v. Maddalena, 45 A.L.J.R. 426 (1971), Adam-
son v. West Perth Football Club (Inc.), 27 A.L.R. 475 (1979), Bartlett v. Indian Pacific Ltd., 68
W.A.I.G. 2508, 2514 (1988) and Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd., 31 F.C.R.
242, 260 (1991) (special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia refused 24 October 1991).
However, arguments to the contrary arise occasionally: Walsh v. Victorian Football League,
A.T.P.R. 40-422, 44,896 (1983) and Barnard v. Australian Soccer Fed., 81 A.L.R. 51, 56 (1988).
This demonstrates the factual nature of the issue.
It is arguable that athletes from the amateur or Olympic team sports who rely on government
financial support through, for example, Australian Institute of Sport scholarships or Sports Talent
Encouragement Plan grants, can be characterised as employees of the federal government accord-
ing to the tests applied in the authorities discussed above. If so, their conditions of "employment"
fall far short of acceptable community standards. For an investigation at length of this argument
in the Canadian context, see ROB BEAMISH & JANE Q. BOROwY, Q. WHAT DO YOU DO FOR A
LIVING? A. I'M AN ATHLETE. (1988).
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A. Implications of Categorisation as Contract of Employment
(1.) Vicarious Liability
The employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the employee
performed in the course of employment. Vicarious liability can even extend
to intentional torts such as battery. By contrast, a person engaging an in-
dependent contractor is not usually exposed to vicarious liability for the
contractor's tortious behaviour.37
The most common kind of harm which may expose an employer sports
team to vicarious liability is physical injury inflicted on a fellow participant,
or perhaps a spectator, 8 by the employee athlete in connection with playing
the sport. It is well established that a player can incur personal liability for
battery arising from deliberate fouls happening not only behind the course
of play39 but closely connected with it.' Of considerable interest are recent
cases that have taken the tort of negligence into new fields by applying it to
the contact or fast-action sports played at close quarters. 41 Australian pro-
fessional team sports fall within this description - even cricket and baseball,
at least in regard to some aspects of their play. In brief, players owe fellow
players a duty to take reasonable care for their safety while playing. Hence,
in the football codes there is a duty to tackle carefully. This is not as outra-
geous as it first seems. The level of care required will usually be very atten-
uated because it must first be acknowledged that force and physical contact
are permitted by the rules or are necessarily incidental to the play. Also,
play is fast with little or no time for reflection. Reasonableness is judged in
accordance with the circumstances of the sport. Most injuries, therefore,
will continue to be inflicted without incurring legal liability. Nevertheless,
an athlete will be answerable for objectively foolhardy conduct.
Whenever the athlete is liable for battery or for negligence, his or her
employer will be vicariously liable if the athlete's wrongful conduct has
been committed in the course of employment. Course of employment is
defined as what is expressly or impliedly authorised or what is within the
ostensible authority of the employee. The courts have given a wide mean-
ing to the notion of "authority" (and, hence, a wide scope to vicarious lia-
bility) by declining to characterise much wrongful conduct as unauthorised,
37. It has been argued they should be. See Ewan McKendrick, Vicarious Liability and In-
dependent Contractors - A Re-examination, 53 MODERN LAW REvIEw 770 (1990).
38. Payne v. Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd., I D.L.R. 369 (1949).
39. E.g., Watherston v. Woolven, 139 L.S.J.S. 366 (1987).
40. E.g., McNamara v. Duncan, 26 A.L.R. 584 (1979), Giumelli v. Johnston, Aust. Torts
Reports 81-085 (1991).
41. Condon v. Basi, [1985] 2 All E.R. 453, Johnston v. Frazer, 21 N.S.W.L.R. 89 (1990)
(special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia refused.)
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preferring instead to describe it as merely unauthorised modes of perform-
ing authorised acts.42 This can extend to cases where express instructions
are disobeyed.43 For instance, a rugby league player told by his coach not
to make any head-high tackles will nevertheless render his employer club
vicariously liable by negligently injuring an opponent with such a tackle.
Even a deliberate foul tackle may incur vicarious liability' in much the
same way as bar staff or bouncers may make hoteliers or nightclub proprie-
tors responsible for injuries deliberately inflicted on patrons.4" If the bat-
tery is motivated by personal spite, or private dispute there will not be
vicarious liability. However, a battery originating from some misguided at-
tempt to advance or protect an employer's interests will have the opposite
effect.46 For example, a deliberate foul tackle intended to disable a leading
opposition player in the hope of improving the chances of victory for the
tackler's team will incur vicarious liability on the employer.
The employee remains responsible despite vicarious liability falling on
the employer - their liability is joint and several. At common law, the em-
ployer is not obliged to indemnify or insure the employee against liability
for torts committed against third parties in the course of employment. An
employer held vicariously liable may recover from an employee. Two
grounds have been advanced for this right of recovery: an implied contrac-
tual right of indemnity and the contribution legislation.47 Some Australian
jurisdictions have legislated to reverse the common law rule with the result
that an employer is not entitled to contribution or indemnity from an em-
ployee for torts committed in the course of employment48 and must indem-
nify the employee against personal liability.49 Even in those jurisdictions
42. Hence, an employer cannot effectively guard against vicarious liability by stating that an
employee is only authorised to perform functions without, say, negligence.
43. Bugge v. Brown, 26 C.L.R. 110 (1919) (Austl.).
44. Rogers v. Bugden (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Lee C.J., 14 Decem-
ber 1990; appeal pending); Dennis Boucher, Club Liable for Player's Actions, 1(1) ANZSLA
NEWSLETTER 5 (1991).
45. Deatons Pty. Ltd. v. Flew, 79 C.L.R. 370 (1949) (Austl.).
46. Poland v. John Parr & Sons, [1927] 1 K.B. 236.
47. Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. Ltd., [1957] A.C. 555. However, in McGrath
v. Fairfield Municipal Council, 156 C.L.R. 672, 675 (1985), the High Court of Australia noted
that Lister, although applied in lower courts in Australia, had "never been the subject of critical
examination in this court."
48. Employees Liability Act 1991 (N.S.W.) § 3(l)(a); Wrongs Act 1936 (S.Austl. Act
& Ord.) § 27C, and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (Nth. Terr.) § 22A.
49. Employees Liability Act 1991 (N.S.W.) § 3(1)(b); Wrongs Act 1936 (S.Austl. Act &
Ord.) § 27C(l)(b), and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (Nth. Terr.)
§ 22A(1)(b).
Legislation in Tasmania requires an employer to insure an employee against liability to fellow
workers, but not strangers; Workers Compensation Act 1988 (Tas.Sess.Stat.) § 97(1). However,
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where the common law rule remains, its impact has been significantly nulli-
fied by federal insurance legislation. 50 An insurer is not entitled to be sub-
rogated to a claim an insured employer may have against an employee for
indemnity or contribution. The operation of the federal and the local legis-
lation cannot be modified even by express agreement between team and ath-
lete. However, the legislation does contain an important exception -
where the athlete is guilty of "serious or wilful misconduct" or "serious and
wilful misconduct"5 in the commission of the tort for which the employer
is vicariously liable. These expressions are not defined in the legislation.
Although they have been explored to some degree in the case law, 2 they
largely involve issues of fact. They presumably extend beyond instances
where a player lands a blow well after a play because vicarious liability for
an employer would be unlikely in those circumstances. Taking drugs which
caused a player to behave carelessly or aggressively toward other players
such that the likelihood or gravity of injury was substantially increased
could constitute serious misconduct. Failure to follow instructions con-
cerning safe training or playing practices might qualify. Conduct that con-
stituted a criminal offence or warranted instant dismissal is often referred to
as falling within the scope of the exception. However, courts should care-
fully confine the scope of the exception to especially serious transgressions
otherwise the exception will overtake the rule. Indeed, the mere fact that a
tribunal has imposed a suspension will not invoke the exception. A court
must make its own assessment of the nature of the misconduct.5 3 It is our
view that many of the offences which come before sports disciplinary tribu-
nals will not qualify.
the benefit of this requirement only applies to situations where the employer would have been
obliged to pay workers' compensation to the injured employee, which is often not the case for
professional team athletes; §§ 7, 25 and 97. Hence, a professional footballer who, while running
onto a ground, negligently knocks over and injures a member of his team as well as an employee
trainer is insured against personal liability to the trainer but not the team mate. This compounds
the incongruity constituted by professional athletes' exclusion from workers' compensation
schemes.
50. Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) § 66. Of course, an uninsured employer might be
motivated to seek contribution or indemnity in those jurisdictions where that remains permitted.
51. Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) § 66 uses the former term and among the local legis-
lation the closest to § 66 is Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (Nth. Terr.)
§ 22A(3) which refers to "serious and wilful, or gross, misconduct." Employees Liability Act 1991
(N.S.W.) § 5 and Wrongs Act 1936 (S.A.) § 27C(3) refer to "serious and wilful misconduct" and
therefore will be less likely to be invoked against an employee.
52. Boral Resources (Queensland) Pty. Ltd. v. Pyke, 93 A.L.R. 89 (1989). See also North v.
Television Corp., 11 A.L.R. 599, 608-09 (1976); MACKEN et al., supra note 13, at 206-07; R.C.
MCCALLUM, MARILYN PITTARD & GRAHAM SMITH, AUSTRALIAN LABOUR LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 136-43 (2d ed. 1990).
53. Hollington v. Hewthom & Co. Ltd., [1943] K.B. 587 (Eng.C.A.).
[Vol. 2:211
AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
(2.) Restraint of Trade
As an employee engaged in a "trade," a professional athlete will be able
to rely upon the restraint of trade doctrine (see below).
(3.) Access to the Formal Industrial Relations System
Employees and their representative bodies will have access to the formal
industrial relations system. Generally, industrial awards (analogous to col-
lective agreements in the United States except that they have a quasi-legisla-
tive status) are only binding in respect of employees - not independent
contractors. 54 Moreover, in most States and under federal industrial rela-
tions legislation, only associations of employees may register as industrial
unions (see below).
(4.) Entitlement to Workers' Compensation
Given the foregoing characterisation of professional team athletes as
employees, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that they do not
have access to the workers' compensation system as a general rule. After
all, the essence of workers' compensation schemes throughout the world is
to provide no-fault compensation to people injured in the course of their
employment. Yet in Australia, many people participating in sporting activ-
ities are specifically excluded from the scope of the workers' compensation
schemes5 even though they might be employees under the usual tests and
derive the whole or the predominant part of their livelihood from playing
sport.
Notwithstanding the moderately long history of workers' compensation
legislation in Australia, the exclusion of professional athletes from the legis-
lation is a relatively recent development. The changes concerning commer-
cialism and professionalism to which we have referred caught up with sport
in the workers' compensation arena in the mid-1970s. At that time deci-
sions of courts and tribunals in Victoria and New South Wales highlighted
the fact that a large number of people participating in sport did so as em-
54. See Building Workers' Indus. Union v. ODCO Pty. Ltd., 99 A.L.R. 735 (1991); special
leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia refused June 7, 1991.
55. See Workers Compensation Act 1987 (N.S.W.) § 3(1) definition of "worker" and clauses
9, 11 and 15 of schedule 1; Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic.) § 16; Workers' Compensation
Act 1916 (Queensl.) § 3(1) definition of "worker" and § 3(3A); Workers Rehabilitation and Com-
pensation Act 1986 (S.A.) § 58; Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (W.Austl.)
§§ 11 and l1A; Workers Compensation Act 1988 (Tas.) § 7; Workers' Compensation Ordinance
1951 (A.C.T.) §§ 6(4A)-(4E); Work Health Act 1986 (N.T.) §§ 3(9)-(10).
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ployees and were entitled to workers' compensation when injured. 6 Not
surprisingly, sports administrators had been oblivious to this entitlement
and did not have the required insurance in many cases. Indicative of the
sports mystique, the community's response was to rush through amend-
ments to remove employee athletes from the scheme of the legislation rather
than to ensure that the workers' compensation coverage was put in place for
them. However, the result is not uniform. Each jurisdiction has its own
exceptions to the exclusion and these need to be watched carefully. This is
not the place to describe them in detail. It is sufficient to illustrate the
complexities by noting that in South Australia an athlete is not excluded if
he or she derives an entire livelihood from playing sport or the income de-
rived exceeds an indexed amount,57 in Victoria there is no exclusion if the
athlete is employed to do things in addition to playing sport,5" and New
South Wales provides a specialised sporting injuries insurance scheme. 9
The growth of national leagues and the changed circumstances sur-
rounding modem professional team sports indicate the importance of re-
moving present anachronistic arrangements in order to achieve uniformity
of entitlements among athletes working in the same leagues.
(5.) Terms Implied into a Contract of Employment
The most obvious benefit to the clubs, as employers, of categorising the
relationship as one of employer and employee is that the relationship will be
governed by a host of wide and flexible obligations known as implied terms.
Of course all contracts contain implied terms, but contracts of employment
contain more (particularly to benefit the employer) than other forms of con-
tract. We will outline the nature and the content of terms commonly im-
plied in contracts of employment below.
(6.) Restrictive Trade Practices Provisions of the Trade Practices Act
Another advantage of the categorisation as employees rather than in-
dependent contractors is that relations between players and clubs are less
likely to be regulated by the pro-competitive provisions of the Trade Prac-
56. E.g., Bailey v. Victorian Soccer Fed'n, [1976] V.RL 13; Smith v. Dandenong Football
Club, 5 W.C.B.D. (Vict.) 98 (1977); Peckham v. Moore, [1975] 1 N.S.W.L.R 353.
57. In 1991, this amount was $35,800; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986
(S.Austl.) § 58(2).
58. Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vict.) § 16(1). Thus, a professional footballer who is
also employed by the club as its public relations officer would be entitled to WorkCare for on-field
as well as off-field injuries.
59. Sporting Injuries Insurance Act, 1978 (N.S.W.).
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tices Act." Although the Act outlaws a wide range of anti-competitive
practices affecting, inter alia, the supply of goods and services, the definition
of "services" does not include the performance of work under a contract of
service,6" that is, an employment contract. So far this has been the major
stumbling block to Act-based challenges to league rules62 concerning trans-
fers63 and the draft." The significance of this factor is highlighted by
Hughes v. Western Austl. Cricket Ass'n (Inc.)65 where unusual circum-
stances meant the relationship between club and athlete was one of princi-
pal and independent contractor - not employer and employee - with the
ultimate result that the Act was successfully invoked by the player.
It has been argued that the contract of employment is capable of divi-
sion into component parts, namely, performance of work by the employee
on one hand and the "club's performing its functions to enable ... [the
player] to receive the benefits he would get from playing" on the other,66
and that it is only the former which has been excluded from the definition
of services in the Act. However, a slightly different but related argument
was rejected in Adamson v. West Perth Football Club (Inc.) 6 and elsewhere
it has been held that "the only services supplied under a [contract of ser-
vice] are the performance of work by the employee for the employer."69
The position now seems settled by the decision of the Full Court of the
Federal Court of Australia in Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby
League70 which has blown these straws away in the wind.71
60. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Part IV - Restrictive Trade Practices. These provisions
owe a substantial portion of their jurisprudential basis to United States antitrust law, in particular
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, although there are significant differences. As indicated elsewhere
in this paper, the Australian legislation, with one irrelevant exception, does not impact on labour
relations law.
61. Id. at § 4(1).
62. However, there may be other possibilities for the challenger to invoke the Act. See Walsh
v. Victorian Football League, A.T.P.R. 40-422 (1983); Carfino v. Australian Basketball Fed'n
Inc., A.T.P.R. 40-895 (1988).
63. Adamson v. West Perth Football Club (Inc.), 27 A.L.R. 475 (1979).
64. Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd., 31 F.C.R. 242 (1991) (special leave to
appeal to the High Court of Australia refused 24 October 1991).
65. 19 F.C.R. 10 (1986).
66. Barnard v. Australian Soccer Fed'n, 81 A.L.R. 51, 56 (1988) (Pincus J).
67. Id
68. 27 A.L.R. 475, 506 (1979)(Austl.). Here, an argument that the "right or privilege to
enter into a contract of service did not come within the exclusive provision of the definition" was
rejected.
69. Wright v. TNT Austl. Pty. Ltd., 15 N.S.W.L.R. 662, 674 per Lee J. (1988).
70. 31 F.C.R. 242 (1991) (special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia refused 24
October 1991).
71. Id. at 259-63 per Wilcox J., Sheppard and Gummow JJ. agreeing.
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(7.) Assignment
Although the employer's right to receive the benefit of the contract of
employment is not assignable in the way many other legal interests are as-
signable,72 it is possible to include an express term permitting assignment in
a written employment contract.73 Such a term may be critical to a club
wishing to trade players, or to a club owner seeking to sell the club. The
players may be the major asset. However, substantial difficulties could be
expected in enforcing performance under the assigned contract.74
B. Rights and Duties Arising Under the Contract of Employment
Terms may be implied into a contract in two different ways. One of
these ways is commonly called 'implication by law' which means that the
terms are implied into the contract regardless of the actual intention of the
parties. The second is the implication of a term which is necessary, in the
circumstances of a particular case, to give business efficacy to the con-
tract. 75 Both types of implied terms may be excluded by an express term in
the contract to the contrary although it is arguably more difficult to ex-
clude, in this manner, a term implied by law. The terms implied by law into
a contract of employment are more extensive than terms implied into other
forms of contract.76 Moreover, these terms provide the employer with a
powerful tool to control the conduct of employees. This is enhanced in the
case of professional athletes by the vague nature of their duties, the public
role inherent in the duties and the widespread view that a strict disciplinary
regime is necessary for successful performance of the duties.
While there are numerous duties which the law will automatically imply
into contracts of employment,77 we will confine discussion to those few
which have particular relevance to professional team sports.
72. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 1014, Denham v. Midland
Employers' Mutual Ltd., [1955] 2 Q.B. 437.
73. Denham v. Midland Employers' Mutual Ltd., [1955] 2 Q.B. 437, 443, Bartlett v. Indian
Pacific Ltd., 68 W.A.I.G. 2508, 2515-16 (1988).
74. See the discussion of the enforcement of positive and negative covenants below.
75. Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. Carlton and United Breweries Ltd., 10 N.S.W.L.R. 468,
486-87per Hope J.A. (1987), Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Auth. of New S. Wales,
149 C.L.R. 337, 345-46 per Mason J. (1982), and MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 52-53.
76. Although there is some debate about this, see Adrian Brooks, Myth and Muddle - An
Examination of Contracts for the Performance of Work, 11 UNI. N.S.W.L.L 48 (1988).
77. See generally CREIGHTON & STEWART, supra note 13, at 95-144, MCCALLUM, PrITARD
& SMITH, supra note 52, at 49-111 and MACKEN et al., supra note 13, at 89-143.
[Vol. 2:211
AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
(1.) Obedience of Orders
The most important is the duty to obey lawful and reasonable orders.
In essence, this requires employees to obey orders which both fall within the
scope of their contracts of employment and are reasonable. Where athletes
are involved, it may often be difficult to determine the scope of the contract
and the factor of reasonableness may have to be judged against the expecta-
tions of the community about what is reasonable in the context of the sport
itself.
The scope of the contract may be defined by reference to professional
obligations. Authority supports the proposition that professional obliga-
tions are to be implied into contracts of professional employment and,
therefore, the employees have a contractual duty to obey directions which
come within those professional obligations. The standards contained in
these professional obligations are those set by both the profession itself and
by public expectation."8 Our reference to "professionals" is not confined to
the traditional notion of "the professions" (such as the medical and legal
professions). In occupations that have unwritten but well established ex-
pectations of conduct and performance - including elite athletes - these
expectations constitute professional obligations which fall within the scope
of the athlete's contract of employment. These obligations may be both
positive and negative. For instance, an order by a coach that an athlete
either refrain from behaviour which will interfere with on-field performance
or do things which will enhance such performance will generally be valid
under this duty. This may include directions to maintain a particular diet,
to not have sex the night before the game (provided it could be proven that
having sex may adversely affect on-field performance79 ), to wear certain
types of clothing or footwear and to play games at particular venues and
times. Directions to take prohibited or potentially dangerous performance-
enhancing drugs could be lawfully refused,80 as could a direction to do
something illegal.8
(2.) Cooperation
There also may be a duty to cooperate in the sense that an athlete has a
positive duty to help or cooperate in the functioning of the club and in
78. See generally Sim v. Rotherham Metro. Borough Council, 3 W.L.R. 851, 870-77 (1986).
In this case, school teachers were held to be "professionals."
79. For a light-hearted examination of this issue, see Brent Crosswell, Sex Before the Game in
R. Fitzgerald, & K. Spillman, THE GREATEST GAME 55 (1988).
80. See The Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian, [1930] A.C. 277.
81. For example, to assault an opponent. See also Kelly v. Afford, [1988] 1 Qd. R. 404.
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promoting its success.8 2 In the context of team sports, this duty would re-
quire active cooperation in the implementation of team plans, perhaps even
to suggest better ones. The duty could also extend to ensuring smooth and
efficient transportation arrangements to and from games.
(3.) Good Faith
Analogous to the duty of cooperation is the duty of fidelity or good
faith. The term "duty of fidelity or good faith" is a broad term which cov-
ers a range of obligations owed by an employee intended to ensure that
honest and faithful service is rendered to the employer. The range of obli-
gations encompass the implied duties of loyalty, honesty, confidentiality
and mutual trust. An employee will breach this duty by engaging in con-
duct that is in opposition or conflict with the employer's interests83 or
which is destructive of the necessary confidence between employer and em-
ployee. In the context of sport, active disruption of team planning or en-
couraging defiance of the coach would infringe the duty. Moreover, it
would seem that the duty requires an employee to tell the truth, perhaps
even to a disciplinary tribunal! 4 It may also be a breach of the duty if an
athlete discloses, for instance to the media, a secret team plan or strategy
or, even, that there is dissension within the club about some action taken or
proposed. Clearly, industrial action by team athletes would infringe the
duty.85
(4.) Care and Competence
An employee also owes a duty of care and competence. This duty is
sometimes divided into two separate duties; namely, a duty to exercise skill
and a duty to exercise reasonable care. The duties have their origins in the
19th century case of Harmer v. Cornelius.86
The duty of skill, in the context of professional team sports, is an im-
plied warranty that the player has the skills which he represents to the Club
as having and that the player will exercise those skills with reasonable com-
petence. In other words, if an Australian Rules football player says he can
kick a football equally well with his left or right foot, but he cannot kick
82. See generally MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 61-65.
83. E.g., Orr v. Univ. of Tasmania, [1956] Tas. S.R. 155 and Re Transfield Pty. Ltd., [1974]
A.R. (N.S.W.) 596.
84. Especially if the disciplinary rules of the league are incorporated into the contract of
employment (see below).
85. See Miles v. Wakefield Metro. Dist. Council, A.C. 539 (1987), though see MCCALLUM et
al., supra note 52, at 139-40.
86. 5 C.B. N.S. 236 (1858); 141 E.R. 94.
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with the left foot at all, there will be a clear breach of the duty.8 7 In such a
case, the breach will probably be sufficiently serious to permit the employer
to terminate the contract. The obligation to exercise reasonable care would
require a player to be careful not to injure other players during training or a
game - including opposing players - and, perhaps, even to break up a
fight between players or to assist injured players.88
(5.) Employer's Duty to Act Reasonably or in Good Faith
The common law contract of employment automatically imposes a
number of obligations upon employers. One such obligation is particularly
important to the degree of discipline (and often punishment) to be imposed
upon players. This obligation involves the employer's duty to act reason-
ably or in good faith. It is analogous to the employee's duty of fidelity. The
duty requires that an employer will not conduct itself in a manner likely to
damage or destroy the relationship of confidence and trust between the par-
ties as employer and employee without reasonable cause.8 9 Thus, if a coach
without reasonable cause humiliates a player in front of the other players,
there is a prima facie breach of contract. Berating players, exhorting them
to greater efforts and pointing out their failings - even vehemently - is per-
missible. Degrading them or constant criticism (if unjustified), such that
the destruction of their own self-confidence results, is outside the bounds of
acceptable conduct.
(6.) Remuneration
Another duty imposed upon employers is the duty to pay reasonable
remuneration. In the absence of an express term as to the rate of remunera-
tion, a reasonable rate could usually be determined by reference to prevail-
ing rates of pay for that type of work in the industry.90 Since an express
term in a player's service contract will override an implied term, the rate of
pay actually agreed in the service contract will prevail. Difficulties arise
where a player is injured or ill and where a player is suspended by the
87. The duty usually extends to requiring the player to disclose any injury which inhibits
relevant athletic performance. In combination with the duty of honesty, this produces a continu-
ing obligation of disclosure, although as a practical matter, the club will usually monitor such
matters and thereby be independently informed.
88. See Sim v. Rotherham Metro. Borough Council, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 851, 873. See also
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vict.) § 25.
89. See Bliss v. S.E. Thames Regional Health Auth., [1987] I.C.R. 700, 714; Marlborough
Harbour Bd. v. Goulden, [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 378, 383; Lock v. Westpac Banking Corp., No. 5447
of 1990 (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Wadden C.J. in Eq., 26 August 1991,
31).
90. See MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 76.
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employer for disciplinary reasons. If there is no express term as to the re-
muneration of a player while unable to play due to injury or illness, the
likely result is that the player will be entitled to the normal rate of remuner-
ation indefinitely or at least until the contract can be lawfully terminated. 91
There is no implied right for an employer to suspend an employee for disci-
plinary reasons connected with the manner of performance of the player's
contract. Examples of this are late arrival at training or failure to wear the
club uniform at official functions. The employer's remedy, if in fact there
has been a breach of contract, is to sue for damages for such breach. If a
player refuses to play or impedes the performance of his or her side of the
contract, the club may be entitled to set off from any wages payable an
amount equal to the damage it has suffered. 92 A player who is wrongly
suspended by a club may sue for damages for breach of contract.93 It is
imperative, therefore, that clubs wishing to impose disciplinary suspension
upon players should include express terms to that effect in the service con-
tracts with the players.
If they do so, they should take particular care in relation to the discipli-
nary penalties. A common law rule - the rule against penalties - pro-
vides that pre-agreed contractual damages must be a genuine pre-estimate
of the damage likely to flow from the breach of contract.94 Thus, if a club
has a rule providing that a player who is late for training will automatically
have deducted a set amount of money from wages by way of a fine, this will
probably infringe the rule against penalties. On its face, the fine will be the
same regardless of whether the player is five minutes late or one hour late.
The rule is that the fine is void and the player could respond by suing the
club for any amount wrongly deducted. In order to avoid infringing the
91. Id. 84-86, Paffv. Speed, 105 C.L.R. 549, 566 (1961), and Graham v. Baker, 106 C.L.R.
340, 344-46 (1961)(Austl.). In most cases lawful termination could be effected by giving the con-
tractually agreed notice of termination or otherwise by giving "reasonable notice." There is no
doctrine of "termination at will" operating in Australian employment law.
92. See Sim v. Rotherham Metro. Borough Council, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 851; Austl. Bank Em-
ployees' Union v. Nat. AustI. Bank Ltd., 31 I.R. 436 (1989); Zamperoni Decorators Pty. Ltd. v.
Lo Presti, [1983] V.R. 338.
93. Hanley v. Pease and Partners Ltd., [1915] 1 K.B. 698, 705, Devonald v. Rosser and Sons,
[1986] 2 K.B. 728, 742 and Re Application by Bldg. Workers' Indus. Union of Austl. 41 F.L.R.
192, 194 (1979).
If a league tribunal wrongly suspends a player and the club acts on the suspension by not
paying wages for the suspension's duration, an action for breach of contract against the club could
be a useful way of collaterally attacking the suspension. Normally, though, direct proceedings
against the league to restrain the enforcement of the suspension will be more appropriate except
where a court would refuse jurisdiction because the suspension had already been served.
94. Pigram v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, 132 C.L.R. 216 (1975) (Austl.), Amos
v. Comm. for Main Roads, 6 I.R. 293 (1984); Arleshiem Ltd. v. Werner, [1958] S.A.S.R 136, 140-
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rule, there must be an element of discretion in the determination of the fine
to be imposed. The discretion should be phrased in a way which suggests
that the amount of the fine will be referrable to the seriousness of the
breach. Wider sporting association disciplinary provisions could also in-
fringe this rule where those rules are incorporated into the individual con-
tracts of employment of the players. 95
(7.) Contractual Duty of Care
An employer owes his or her employees an implied contractual duty of
care. This duty will usually be enforceable as a wider statutory duty under
occupational health and safety legislation.96 In Cotter v. Huddart Parker
Ltd., Chief Justice Jordan described the employer's duty of care:
The special duties which are owed to an employee... arise by virtue
of implications in the contract of employment. They comprise the
duties to ensure, so far as is possible to do so by the exercise of
reasonable care, (1) that the persons selected to work with him as
his fellow employees are competent, (2) that the premises at which
he is to work, and the appliances in use there, are safe, and (3) that
the general system of working which is in use is also safe.97
Thus, a club may be under a duty to its employees to prevent a player
known to be unduly violent, or even reckless or routinely negligent in his or
her play, from training or playing.98 Subject to the medical evidence, the
duty will oblige a club to remove players from a game or training if they are
concussed or bleeding.99 Ensuring that the premises are safe may include
providing appropriate padding on goal posts, eliminating dangerous objects
around the boundary of the field and (depending on the circumstances)
keeping spectators off the playing surface until the athletes have departed.
The duty to provide a safe system of work would include an obligation to
ensure that safe practices are followed during training - in particular, that
95. As to incorporation, see below.
96. See Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vict.) § 21 and Occupational Health and
Safety Act, 1983, (N.S.W.) § 15.
97. 41 N.S.W.St.R. 33, 37-38 (1941).
98. This may extend to the club being obliged to refuse to play against sides with players with
known violent or dangerous propensities, or at least to pressure the league or opposing club to
take action against such players.
99. To prevent the possible transmission of human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and
other infectious diseases. There is at least one reported incident of HIV being transmitted through
a collision in soccer, 335 The Lancet 1105 (1990); see also Alan Sullivan, The Legal Liability of the
Player and of His Club 6, paper presented on May 19, 1991 to The Law of Professional Team
Sports Conference conducted by the Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Association Inc.
and The Univ. of Melbourne Law School Continuing Education Program.
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training periods are not excessive in duration or intensity so as to endanger
a player's health."°°
There is no reason of principle why the system of "work" ought not to
include the playing rules of the sport. Thus, the club has an obligation to
ensure that those rules are reasonably "safe." Often the power to fix the
playing rules rests with the sports association, not the club individually, and
a fair concern is that the club ought not be held accountable for matters
over which it lacks real control. The likely response of the law is to impose
an obligation to refuse to field a team if the rules constitute an unsafe sys-
tem. No doubt this is an unenviable dilemma for the club: risk legal liabil-
ity for injury to the player or incur the fury of the league if there is
resistance within the league to rule change. A legal approach is unhelpful
and less likely to achieve the objective of improving safety because there
will arise some cases where employer clubs will prefer to avoid the league's
fury. A possible solution lies in the imposition of responsibility on the
league. The imposition would have to be a general duty under the tort of
negligence at common law because the league will not usually be the em-
ployer of the players. In any event, the sports associations risk severe crimi-
nal penalties under occupational health and safety legislation with respect
to playing rules that are not as "safe" as is "practicable" regardless of
whether they employ any of the players.101 An example of this problem is
found in the interchange rules of the football codes. There have been a
number of reported incidents of injured players being returned to play be-
cause a team had exhausted its interchange bench. An amendment of the
rules to allow for more interchange players to take the field in the event of
injury would remove the pressing practical temptation to continue with in-
jured players. While primary responsibility must rest with the club for en-
dangering its already injured players,102 we suggest that sports associations
cannot afford to turn a "Nelsonian eye" at least for reasons of the
legislation.0 3
The employer's duty of care is a non-delegable duty. If an employer
engages an independent contractor (such as a chiropractor or physiother-
apist), the employer will be liable to the player for any injury negligently
caused or aggravated by the independent contractor. This liability is not a
vicarious liability as commonly understood. Rather, the independent con-
100. Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health Auth., [1991] 2 All E.R. 293.
101. E.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vict.) § 22.
102. This responsibility could even extend to liability for exemplary damages. For an ex-
traordinary example from Canada, see Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., 124 D.L.R.
(3d) 228 (1981).
103. See also Legal Threat to AFL on Injuries, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 14, 1991.
[Vol. 2:211
AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
tractor's wrongful conduct is a direct breach of the employer's non-delega-
ble duty to the employee."° Thus, the employer's duty is one not only of
taking reasonable care itself and through its employees but of also being
responsible for the negligence of independent contractors.
(8.) Duty to Indemnify
An employer has a contractual duty to indemnify an employee for ex-
penses properly incurred by the employee in and about carrying out his or
her duties.105 Unless there is an express term in the service contract to the
contrary, a club may be liable to pay the costs of an operation or medical
treatment which the employee requires in order to continue playing. This
would not necessarily be confined to operations and medical treatments re-
lated to injuries and conditions arising from the sport. For instance, a
"constitutional" health problem may not normally impede other forms of
working lifestyle but might restrict sporting performance. Medical costs
incurred to rectify the problem would be recoverable by virtue of the im-
plied term because they would be unnecessary apart from the demands of
the sport employment.
(9.) Duty to Provide Work
The final duty to which we will refer is the employer's duty to provide
work. In most areas of employment an employer's duty extends no further
than an obligation to provide remuneration. There is no duty to actually
provide work." 6 However, there are exceptions to this principle. Some
employees have remuneration in the form of a commission and some em-
ployees in the entertainment industry can demand under their employment
contracts to be given work of a particular kind to perform. The latter ex-
ception is premised on the concept that the entertainers be given an oppor-
tunity to exercise and display their talents is implicit in their employment
contract. 107 If not put to use before the public's eye, talent and reputation
quickly fade. It is our view that since professional team athletes have simi-
larly ephemeral careers, they will generally come within this exception.
Unless there is an express term in the contract to the contrary, a player who
is ready, willing and able to perform at the agreed level has a contractual
104. Kondis v. State Trans. Auth., 54 C.L.R. 672 (1984) (Austl.).
105. See MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 108.
106. Forbes v. New S.Wales Trotting Club Ltd., 143 C.L.R. 242, 260-61 (1979) (Austl.),
Hughes v. West Austl. Cricket Ass'n (Inc.), 19 F.C.R. 10, 52 (1986) and, see generally MCCAL-
LUM et al., supra note 52, at 102-05.
107. Marbe v. George Edwardes (Daly's Theatre) Ltd., [1928] 1 K.B. 269, White v. Australia
and New Zealand Theatres Ltd., 67 C.L.R. 266 (1943) (Austl.).
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right to do so. Accordingly, in Bartlett v. The Indian Pacific, Ltd., Com-
missioner Fielding said:
It is very much the part of a professional footballer's lot that he have
playing exposure in order to enhance his reputation and so presuma-
bly further his career. A footballer who sits in the audience ceases to
be a footballer.' 8
In that case, Commissioner Fielding found that a footballer contracted
to play with the West Coast Eagles (who traded as Indian Pacific Ltd. and
was entered in the Victorian Football League) had been entitled to treat
himself as dismissed from his employment when he was left off the Club's
player list - even though the club continued to pay for his services. Ac-
cording to the Commissioner:
Being on the list of players afforded him exposure in his trade which
would not otherwise be available. He no longer had an opportunity
to display his talents in the VFL competition, an opportunity to
which it seems most professional footballers aspire.109
The Commissioner awarded the footballer $8,500 in compensation for
denied contractual benefits.110 By being left off the player list the player
was "constructively dismissed" from the West Coast Eagles, and the $8,500
represented the difference between what he could have received if he had
been able to continue playing in the VFL competition and what he would
receive for playing in the Western Australian Football League for the dura-
tion of his contract (as he was otherwise obliged to do).
C. Incorporation of Terms
Apart from terms described above which are automatically implied into
the contract by operation of law, 1 often other terms will be incorporated
into the contract "by reference." These may be incorporated either ex-
pressly or impliedly.112 A typical example of express incorporation is to be
found in the following clauses of the standard Australian Football League
("AFL") Playing Contract:
2. The Player shall for the term of this Contract:
2.1 ...
108. 68 W.A. Indus. Gaz., 2508, 2517 (1988).
109. Id. at 2517.
110. Under § 29(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (W.A.), the Western Australian In-
dustrial Relations Commission is able to decide whether an employee has not been allowed by his
employer a benefit to which he is entitled under his contract of service.
111. Subject to any contrary intention of the parties.
112. E.g., Alexander v. Standard Tel. & Cables Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] I.R.L.R. 286, 291-92;
Marley v. Forward Trust Group Ltd., [1986] I.C.R. 891; Gregory v. Philip Morris Ltd., 80
A.L.R. 455, 479 (1988); Camden Exhibition & Display Ltd. v. Lynott, [1966] 1 Q.B. 555.
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2.6 Obey all Rules and Regulations, Resolutions and Determi-
nations of the Club and abide by the Memorandum and Ar-
ticles of Association of the Club.
7. The Player and the Club agree with the AFL to comply with and
observe the Rules and Regulations of the AFL, the Player Rules,
the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the AFL and
any determinations or resolutions of the AFL Commission which
may be made or passed prior to or at any time after the execution
of this Contract ....
By this device the contract incorporates the contents of all of the rules
and documents referred to as varied from time to time. Thus, for instance,
the Rules and Regulations of the AFL which empower the imposition of
discipline for certain breaches of the Rules of the Game, become terms of
the contract of employment. Accordingly, if a player breaches these Rules
of the Game on the field, he is not only responsible under them but also
usually breaches the contract of employment.1 13
Another issue concerning implied terms arises from contractual provi-
sions such as Clause 18 of the AFL Playing Contract:
This Contract embodies all of the terms of the Agreement between
the parties save for the Rules and Regulations, Player Rules, Memo-
randum and Articles of Association of the AFL, the determinations
or resolutions of the AFL Commission, and the Memorandum and
Articles of Association and Rules of the Club by which the Player
has agreed to be bound. Each party acknowledges that no represen-
tation has been relied upon in entering into this Contract which has
not been referred to herein and the terms hereof shall not be varied
except by an instrument in writing signed by each of the parties
hereto.
Does the statement that the contract embodies "all of the terms of the
Agreement between the parties" exclude the various implied terms to which
we have referred? The answer is probably no. This is because such implied
terms would usually have to be expressly excluded or an inconsistent provi-
sion made. It could also be argued that the clause excludes terms implied to
give business efficacy to the contract, but this is unlikely to succeed. 1 4 The
clause is probably only intended to prevent any two parties115 from amend-
ing the contract without the consent of the third party, and this is why it
113. See generally ROGER RIDEOUT, RIDEOUT'S PRINCIPLES OF LABOUR LAw 32-34 (4th
ed. 1983).
114. See generally Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. Carlton and United Breweries Ltd., 10
N.S.W.L.R. 468, 490-92 (1987).
115. The AFL Playing Contract usually has three parties: the AFL, the Club and the Player.
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goes on to provide that "the terms hereof shall not be varied except by an
instrument in writing signed by each of the parties hereto."'1 16
D. Express Terms
An express service contract between a player and club serves two pur-
poses. First, it adds certainty to the contract in the sense that it defines the
terms of the relationship more clearly than if reliance were placed solely on
the terms implied by the common law. Second, a service contract creates
and specifies obligations and duties which would not otherwise exist at com-
mon law.
The express terms contained in a service contract will usually impose
positive and negative obligations, that is, the player agrees to do some
things and not to do other things. We will deal shortly with the question of
how and to what extent these terms are enforceable. But before doing so it
is necessary to consider the changing nature of such contracts and their
importance in sport.
Until the 1960s, express service contracts were rare. The few in exist-
ence tended to be individualised and negotiated between the club and its
more outstanding professional players. Terms were few and related primar-
ily to remuneration. The remaining legal obligations between the player
and the club derived from two separate sources. First, common law implied
terms (which we have discussed above) were relied on to some extent. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the rules of the sporting association governed
the allocation of players between clubs, among other things. These rules
have taken various forms. They have included geographic zoning rules al-
locating a player to a club by place of birth or place of residence at a speci-
fied age, and rules prohibiting the transfer of players between clubs without
permission of the last club to which the player was allocated or only on
payment of a transfer fee to that club. Sometimes these rules were incorpo-
rated into the player contracts by reference, often they were made between
clubs and the league only - but with significant effect on players.
Challenge to restrictive player allocation practices began in earnest with
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd.117 Eastham held that a
professional soccer player was engaged in a trade and that the "retain and
transfer" rules of the English professional soccer leagues infringed the re-
straint of trade doctrine. Eastham was first applied in Australia by the
116. Clause 18 is strengthened by an administrative requirement of the AFL that an officer of
the Club and the Player each complete a statutory declaration that there have been no amend-
ments to the Playing Contract.
117. [1964] 1 Ch. 413 (England).
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High Court of Australia in Buckley v. Tutty. 118 Other cases have fol-
lowed," 9 but for present purposes the most significant of these cases was
Foschini v. Victorian Football League.1 20 In that case Justice Crockett made
it clear that he thought that the best solution for sports clubs if they were to
seek some form of security of tenure over their players was to move towards
a contract system. He said:
Fundamentally why the present system in Australia is the mono-
lithic system that it is is because it confers on clubs throughout the
country "title" to every footballer without any reciprocal obliga-
tion's [sic] being placed upon a club. The club is not obliged to
transfer the player even though it is unprepared to play him or pay
him or to enter into a contract with him. Contracts with players are
becoming increasingly common. They appear generally to be
honoured by both sides. To introduce their general use would seem
to present the best prospect of solving the present problem of compe-
tition for players operating in conflict with the permit and clearance
rules.121
The era from Eastham to Foschini was one during which the law clearly
favoured the legal individualism of players over the perceived collective in-
terests of professional leagues. It was indeed a golden era of individualism.
A free agent could hold out for the highest bidder. Any attempt by his
previous club to enforce the restrictive league rules on player movements
could be despatched with the threat of legal action alleging restraint of
trade. Club managements obsessed with "buying premierships" engaged in
"cheque book warfare" with their opponents. Even so, only the more
highly skilled free agents could take full advantage of this open market phi-
losophy. Also, it took a brave player to risk the wrath of management and
the prospect of legal costs. However, because of sporting associations' fear
that a court would declare their rules to be unlawful as in restraint of trade
most such actions or even threats of actions were settled in favour of the
players.
E. The Shift Toward Collectivism
Foschini represented a high-water mark for this legal individualism.
Although the move to individual contracting recognised by Justice Crockett
118. 125 C.L.R. 353 (1971) (Austl.).
119. E.g., Carfino v. Austl. Basketball Fed'n Inc., A.T.P.R. 40-895 (1988); Hall v. Victorian
Football League, [1982] V.R. 64; Adamson v. West Perth Football Club (Inc.), 27 A.L.R. 475
(1979).
120. 1982 No. 9868, V.S.Ct. (April 15, 1983).
121. Id. at 25.
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was strengthened by his decision, within the past few years there has been a
reversal in the balance of interests between individualism and collectivism.
We have identified this occurring in four principal ways.
1. The recent successful legal challenge in Adamson v. New South
Wales Rugby League Ltd. 12 2 to the League's internal player draft
was a product of unprecedented collective action initiated by the
Rugby League Players' Union. 123
The internal player draft in that case, as well as the current draft
system in the AFL, owe much of their origins to the judgment of
Justice Crockett in Foschini. Justice Crockett favoured the proposi-
tion that one means of ensuring that the poorer clubs had better
access to talented players was to expand and institutionalise the
then limited draft of interstate players in the Victorian Football
League.1 24 A draft can take various forms, but its guiding principle
is that the pool of players not contracted to clubs ("free agents") are
available to clubs in reverse order to each club's place in the previ-
ous year's competition. Hence, the last place team has the first se-
lection and so forth. Over time the best players are evenly spread
across the teams, or so the theory holds. 125 The ultimate objective
is an even competition in which outcomes of matches are unpredict-
able. This is said to maximise spectator interest and increase reve-
nues. Hence, the economic welfare of the league, clubs and players
is maximised.126
In Adamson v. N.S. W. Rugby League Ltd., a large number of
players from the 16 clubs in the New South Wales Rugby League
("NSWRL") challenged the internal draft which allocated between
clubs those players who, after their contracts had expired, failed to
reach a new agreement with their respective employing clubs. After
losing at the trial of the action, the plaintiff players obtained a unan-
imous verdict from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia
that the internal draft was an unreasonable restraint of trade and,
therefore, void.
122. 31 F.C.R. 242 (1991) (special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia refused
October 24, 1991).
123. See below for an outline of the Union's background.
124. 1982 No. 9868, slip op. at 25, V.S.Ct. (April 15, 1983).
125. However, the theory can be doubted at least for the reason that it assumes teams have
equal access to information concerning the best draft picks.
126. For an example of a fuller statement of this theory of professional team sports economics
see Owen Covick, Sporting Equality in Professional Team Sports Leagues and Labour Market
Controls: What is the Relationship?, 2(2) Sporting Traditions 54, 55 (1986).
[Vol. 2:211
AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
In our view, this case will come to be recognised as the begin-
ning of a new era in the organisation of professional team sports in
Australia. While from one perspective it merely continues the suc-
cess which players had experienced in challenging rules restricting
player independence to select employers,127 it is the first determined
collective legal challenge by players to the authority which team
and league management purport to exercise over them. Past chal-
lenges were individual affairs, although often promoted by disaf-
fected clubs. On this occasion the Union was of crucial significance
to the processes of stimulating and managing the court action. An
individual player would have experienced great difficulty in funding
the litigation and assembling the evidence128 for a successful chal-
lenge. 29 It is also highly likely that an individual player would
have been deterred by the unfavourable decision of the trial judge,
namely, that although the draft acted as a restraint of trade of pro-
fessional rugby league players, it was reasonable and therefore law-
ful. Indeed, a union is more likely to take a broader and longer
term perspective when pursuing a claim whereas an individual's de-
cision about litigation will be much more governed by personal and
immediate considerations.
The intervention and success of the Union will no doubt
strengthen and embolden its dealings with the NSWRL in the fu-
ture. Also, the case serves as a precedent for other player associa-
tions. The AFL Players' Association is negotiating a new collective
agreement with the AFL. The prospect that the Association might
challenge the AFL's draft system (which is similar to the NSWRL's
void system in many significant respects) has no doubt encouraged
the AFL to enter into genuine negotiations on a wide range of
player grievances previously left unaddressed.
Indeed, to the extent that future restraints may become collec-
tively bargained between management and players rather than im-
posed unilaterally by management, the courts may come to take a
127. See also Nobes v. Australia Cricket Bd.; [1992] Australian Current Law Reports 175
V.R. 2; Steven Wright, Nobes Hits Australian Cricket Board for Six, 1(4) ANZSLA NEWVSLETrER
1 (1991).
128. Among other things, this case showed the court how a variety of players were affected
by the draft rules.
129. This may be one reason why an individual challenge to the AFL's draft wilted shortly
after it was commenced in December 1991. See Challenge to AFL Draft Abandoned, 1(4) ANZ-
SLA NEWSLETTER 3 (1991).
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different approach to deciding the restraints' validity. We will re-
turn to this aspect towards the end of this paper.
2. The second way in which legal individualism has declined since Fos-
chini has been through the increasing standardisation of player con-
tracts. During the 1980s, most major professional team sports
developed standard form contracts required to be signed by every
player. The impact of this development on individualism can be
better assessed by comparison with the major professional leagues
of the United States. The use of standard form contracts in those
leagues has been widespread for many years. However, the stan-
dard form is regarded as a core set of minimum terms designed to
avoid exploitative labour practices. A minimum salary is usually
specified. Players, therefore, use the standard as a starting point
from which to negotiate their individual contracts. By contrast, the
limited experience of standard forms in this country has been al-
most as a code of terms not to be varied. All that is open for negoti-
ation are remuneration and duration.130 Given that in, say, the
AFL the overwhelming majority of players have contracts of one
year's duration with an option for a further year, there is no mini-
mum salary and each club has a league-imposed salary cap within
which the player's remuneration must be accommodated, there is
quite limited scope for individual bargaining.
3. The salary cap, used by the AFL, NSWRL and the National Bas-
ketball League, is another mechanism aimed at evening the compe-
tition through eliminating "cheque book warfare." By limiting the
total amount individual clubs can pay their players, wealthier clubs
are precluded from buying or retaining disproportionate numbers of
the best players. While this measure is a further instance of collec-
tivism asserting itself over individualism, it is not wholeheartedly
supported. A number of the AFL clubs, usually the more success-
ful ones, have publicly and privately criticised this "football social-
ism." Interestingly, the salary cap was not challenged in Adamnson
v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd. While the cap received
prominent mention in the case, the Court was careful not to pro-
nounce upon its validity.13
4. In two cases decided in the late 1980s, the Victorian courts edaib-
ited a quite vigorous approach toward the enforcement of negative
130. We make this comparison to highlight the nature of the Australian experience. The
explanation for the difference seems to rest in a complex mix of social and economic factors.
131. See, e.g., 31 F.C.R. 242, 249 (1991) (Sheppard, J.).
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covenants in player service contracts. Traditionally, the courts have
allowed great scope to individual liberty by refusing to take action
which might directly or indirectly compel the performance of ser-
vice contracts. Thus, a player could refuse to fulfill his or her obli-
gation to play for a club, commence with another club and leave the
original club only with its remedy of suing for damages. However,
by giving new scope to indirectly compelling the performance of
contracts, these Victorian cases favoured employers over employees
in a way which can be viewed as somewhat surprising. This devel-
opment will be discussed at some length in the next section. While
it is clearly a movement away from individualism, it is not necessar-
ily one toward collectivism. Even so, it does substantially underpin
the collectivist approach to player contracting which now prevails
in the leagues (which approach has been fuelled by the clubs' desires
to achieve the control over player movements which the restraint of
trade doctrine has denied them).
We believe that these developments have made the growth of collective
bargaining within professional team sports inevitable. This growth may ul-
timately lead to the entry of sporting industrial relations into the main-
stream industrial relations system. There is already evidence of this with
the recent registration of the former New South Wales Rugby Players' As-
sociation as a union under the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (N.S.W.). 132
F. The Enforcement of Positive and Negative Covenants 133
(1.) Positive Covenants
Positive covenants or positive obligations include all of the promises of a
player to do particular things. For instance, to obey all reasonable direc-
tions of the coach or to play in all football matches and so on. Not infre-
quently, disputes will arise between a player and a club over either the
performance of obligations within the club (for example, to attend training)
or over a desire on the part of the player to play for another club. In what
circumstances will a court order the player to carry out his or her positive
obligations?13 4
In general, a court will not enforce such positive obligations. Contracts
of employment are personal contracts and the courts have long been loathe
132. This development is investigated further below.
133. See generally Gel Furness, Injunctions and the Contract of Employment, 2 AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 234 (1989).
134. Our emphasis on orders for compliance with positive and negative covenants should not
be taken as suggesting that advisers overlook damages as a possible remedy.
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to specifically enforce them because to do so would turn them into "con-
tracts of slavery" and often place unduly onerous, if not impossible, respon-
sibilities on the courts in regard to the contracts' supervision.135 Indeed,
until recently, there was a rule against specific performance of contracts of
employment. 136 However, in Australia there is no longer any such rule and
the courts will consider as a matter of discretion whether such an order
should be granted."3 It is clear that such an order will be exceptional and
is likely only to be granted where the employment relationship is somewhat
impersonal. Thus, such an order may be granted where the employer is a
large organisation or large corporation and the employee who is ordered to
perform his or her contract will not necessarily be required to work with
persons with whom they cannot get along. In other words, there may be
other parts of the organisation or corporation in which the employee can
work.
In the case of a small organisation, like a sports club, where good per-
sonal relations and discipline are paramount, it is difficult to see a court
making an order which requires continued personal service. 138
It may be possible for a club to indirectly enforce a positive obligation
by obtaining an injunction against the third party (for instance, another
club) seeking to persuade the player to break a contract of employment
with the club. However, the recent decision of the English Court of Appeal
135. This concern about supervisory responsibilities has been criticised in Turner v. Australa-
sian Coal & Shale Employees' Fed'n, 55 A.L.R. 635 (1984).
136. Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40, 65; J.C. Wilhiamson v. Lukey & Mulholland, 45
C.L.R. 282, 297-98 (1931) (Austl.).
137. Turner v. Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Fed'n, 55 A.L.R. 635, 648-49 (1984);
Gregory v. Philip Morris Ltd., 80 A.L.R. 455, 481-82 (1988); Reilly v. State of Victoria, Unre-
ported Supreme Court of Victoria, Smith J., November 20, 1991.
138. It is interesting to note that industrial tribunals may adopt a similar approach to the
question of reinstatement of unfairly dismissed athletes. Thus, Commissioner Fielding said in
Bartlett v. Indian Pacific Ltd., 68 W.A.I.G. 2508, 2518 (1988):
Even if the dismissal was unfair, as the Applicant claims, I would not be minded to exer-
cise the discretion vested in the Commission to order that he be reinstated into the Respon-
dent's list of players. It might well be in the best interests of the Applicant to reinstate him
but football is a team game. The team does not train solely for the benefit of individual
players. Rather, the players who make up, or have the potential to make up, the team
practise together so as to improve their skills in order that they might be better utilised in
combination with those of the others in the team and the team thereby prosper. In those
circumstances to insist that a player be retained in the training squad in the face of objec-
tions from the coach and team selectors and where there is no prospect of him playing for
the team seems to me to have an air of unreality about it. It undermines the basic concept
of a team game and, I suspect, has the potential to undermine the team's performance if
nothing else. There needs to be some degree of reality about the enforcement of industrial
laws of this kind; not a blind adherence to academic principles.
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in Warren v. Mendy 139 seems to have largely closed this legal option. In
that decision the Court said:
[We] are all of the opinion that the court ought usually to refuse the
grant of an injunction against a third party who induces a breach of
the contract if on the evidence its effect would be to compel perform-
ance of the contract. If that were not so, the master could... obtain
by the back door relief which he could not obtain through the
front. 14
The enforcement of positive obligations thus presents particular difficul-
ties for sports administrators. As the scope of such obligations is expanded
by express terms in player contracts 141 their enforcement will present even
greater difficulties. We will no doubt see more litigation on this topic.
(2.) Negative Covenants
Most modem standard form player contracts include express negative
covenants. Typically, they oblige the player, at the very least, not to play
professionally in the relevant sport for another club in the same association
or league. For instance, the NSWRL Playing Contract provides that the
player will "not play in any Rugby League Football match other than for
the Club or in a representative match sanctioned or approved by the League
or the Australian Rugby League (except with the express prior written con-
sent of the Club)."142 The AFL Playing Contract is even more explicit and
detailed. Clause 2. provides:
The Player shall for the term of this Contract:
2.7 Not play or train for Australian Rules football with any other
club, company, person or entity fielding a team or teams in the
AFL Competition or any other Australian Rules football com-
petition or any exhibition or promotional match.
2.8 Not enter into any contract, agreement, arrangement, under-
standing or option to play football for any other club, company,
139. [1989] 3 All E.R. 103.
140. Id. at 539. Compare the quite different facts of World Series Cricket Pty. Ltd. v. Insole,
[1978] 3 All E.R. 449, where the players wished to stay with the first employer (World Series
Cricket) and a declaration was obtained by the employer against the third party declaring unlaw-
ful its interference with that relationship. As a practical matter such declarations are obeyed and
it becomes unnecessary to seek an injunction. See also TCN Channel Nine Pty. Ltd. v. Northern
Star Holdings Ltd., AUSTL. INDUS. LAWv REVIEW 298 (1990).
141. For instance, by clauses such as the New South Wales Rugby League's Playing Contract
Clause 3.(1)(e) to "undergo drug testing if and when requested to do so by the Club". See also
Richard Johnstone, Pre-employment Health Screening: The Legal Framework, 1 AUSTL. J. OF
LAB. L. 115 (1988).
142. Clause 3(1)(h).
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person or entity without first obtaining the written consent of
the Club.
2.9 Not enter into any discussions, negotiations, contract, agree-
ment, arrangement, understanding or option which would pre-
vent the Player or which gives the Player or any other club,
company, person or entity the right to prevent the Player from
complying with any of the provisions of this Contract. Nothing
in this sub-clause 2.9 shall prevent the Player from engaging in
commensurate secular employment or business.
Other clauses in the AFL Playing Contract oblige the player not to en-
gage in any dangerous or hazardous activity that may affect the ability of
the player to perform his obligations under the contract. 143 Further clauses
require the player not to commercialise his identity, presumably so that the
Club and the AFL can maintain some global control over commercial mar-
keting of the sport."4
Such negative covenants are generally expressed to operate only during
the life of the contract. In other words, they are not post-employment re-
straints on the employee's ability to trade 4' and should be distinguished
from the cases discussed above relating to restrictions - such as transfer
rules - on a player's freedom to choose an employer. Accordingly, it is
difficult to argue that they infringe the restraint of trade doctrine.1 46
143. Clause 2.12 provides that the Player shall:
Not engage in any dangerous or hazardous activity which in the reasonable opinion of the
Club may affect the Player's ability to perform his obligations under this Contract without
first obtaining the consent of the Club, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
144. The Player shall:
2.14 Not enter into any contract, arrangement or understanding to promote the Player's
name, photograph, reputation, likeness and identity as an Australian Rules football
player or endorse any product or service in trade or commerce by means of advertis-
ing the fact that the Player is an AFL footballer or a player of the Club, without first
obtaining the consent of the Club which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
2.15 Not to permit or allow the name, photograph, likeness, reputation, and identity of the
Player to be used in any way in connection with or in relation to any goods or serv-
ices without first obtaining the consent of the Club which consent shall not be unrea-
sonably withheld.
145. As to post-employment restraints, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW
OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE 62-151 (1986); Philip Sales, Covenants Restricting Recruitment ofEm-
ployees and the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade, 104 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 600 (1988) and
Howard F. Hudson Pty. Ltd. v. Ronayne, 126 C.L.R. 449 (1972) (Austl.).
146. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd., [1968] A.C. 269, 294;
William Robinson & Co. Ltd. v. Heuer, [1988] 2 Ch. 451, 455. However, there is growing recog-
nition that there exists a limited range of circumstances where the restraint of trade doctrine may
be applied to strike down unreasonably restrictive contractual terms notwithstanding that the
employment contract is current - see A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3
All E.R. 616, Watson v. Prager, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 726 and Michael I. Yanover & Harvey G.
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Nevertheless, courts rarely enforce such negative covenants in contracts
for personal services. 147 The reason is a fear that enforcement will result in
specific performance of the contract by the "back door." The classic state-
ment of principle as to the limited circumstances in which a court will re-
strain a breach of a negative covenant is the dictum of Justice Branson in
Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Nelson:
The conclusion to be drawn from the authorities is that, where a
contract of personal service contains negative covenants the enforce-
ment of which will not amount either to a decree of specific perform-
ance of the positive covenants of the contract or to the giving of a
decree under which the defendant must either remain idle or per-
form those positive covenants, the Court will enforce those negative
covenants; but this is subject to a further consideration. An injunc-
tion is a discretionary remedy, and the Court in granting it may limit
it to what the Court considers reasonable in all the circumstances of
the case. 148
These principles give a court some latitude to restrain a breach of a
negative covenant. There is considerable subjectivity in determining
whether, in respect of particular facts, an order will or will not amount to
specific performance, or whether the defendant will remain idle or pursue
some other occupation.
In Australian professional team sports, where standard contracts con-
tain negative covenants such as those outlined above, the scope of these
principles assumes considerable importance. Will a court restrain a player
from contracting with and/or playing with another team? This question
was answered rather emphatically by the Supreme Court of Victoria in two
decisions in 1987.49 In Buckenara v. Hawthorn Football Club, Ltd.15 Jus-
tice Crockett (whom it will be remembered was the judge in Foschini) or-
dered that the Hawthorn footballer, Gary Buckenara, be restrained for a
two-year period from playing football with any football team in the Victo-
rian Football League, other than Hawthorn. The judge found that Haw-
thorn had a contractual right to the player's services for those two years
and that it could thus rely upon negative covenants in his contract similar
Kotler, Artist/Management Agreements and the English Music Trilogy: Another British Invasion?,
9 LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 211 (1989).
147. For recent judicial analysis of the cases concerning this issue see Warren v. Mendy,
[1989] 3 All E.R. 103.
148. [1937 1 K.B. 209, 217. See also Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.M. & G. 604 (1852), 42
E.R. 687 (1852).
149. See also North Adelaide Football Club v. Riley, No. 724 of 1984 S.Austl. S.Ct., Greg
Griffin, Life in the A.FL 'Days of Swine and Roses" 12 L. Soc'y. BULL. 132, 134 (June 1990).
150. [1988] V.R. 39.
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to those quoted above in the AFL standard contract. However, the judge
decided to restrain Buckenara only from playing with other teams hi the
VFL for the duration of his contract with Hawthorn. Crockett reasoned
that Buckenara would not be forced to remain idle because he could, if he
wished, play in other professional football leagues, such as the Western
Australian Football League. In that respect, only part of the the negative
covenant was enforced. Of considerable significance is the judge's recogni-
tion of the "legitimate commercial interests" of the Club and of his desire to
uphold the contract system. 151 Buckenara marks a weakening of the bar-
gaining position of the individual player and a corresponding strengthening
of the collective and commercial interests of the club and sports association.
The day before Justice Crockett's decision in Buckenara, Justice Tadgell
gave an equally important judgment in Hawthorn Football Club Ltd. v. Har-
ding.15 2 Harding, like Buckenara, was intent on avoiding a contractual ob-
ligation to play for Hawthorn. However, the order made by Justice Tadgell
went further than the order in Buckenara in that Harding was restrained
for three seasons "from playing or agreeing with any person to play football
for reward in Victoria or elsewhere for any football club other than" Haw-
thorn. The only obvious significant factual difference between Harding and
Buckenara was that Harding had another profession (that of a dental tech-
nician) to which he could have turned if he chose not to continue to play
football with Hawthorn. Buckenara, on the other hand, had no particular
employment skills other than football. Thus, Buckenara could have been
idle if the full force of the negative covenant had been applied to him,
whereas Harding had the possibility of other pursuits even if prevented
from playing professional football at all. Justice Tadgell, like Justice Crock-
ett, was also concerned about protecting the commercial interests of the
Hawthorn Football Club, in particular the $25,000 signing fee paid to Har-
ding by Hawthorn. Justice Tadgell likened the signing bonus to an invest-
ment in the defendant.
If the defendant were to be free, in breach of his contract with the
plaintiff, to play football with a football club anywhere in Australia
without the plaintiff's permission, the plaintiff's investment would
be likely to be unprotected. It is, in my opinion, an investment which
the plaintiff is entitled to attempt to protect.15 3
We consider that these decisions go much further than would have been
thought possible from many of the earlier cases and in so doing have
151. Id. at 43.
152. [1988] V.R. 49.
153. Id. at 62.
[Vol. 2:211
AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
strengthened the movement away from individualism to collectivism. In-
deed, recent English decisions have been very much more conservative."' 4
For instance, in Evening Standard Ltd. v. Henderson,155 the Court of Ap-
peal restrained a breach of a negative covenant for one year, but only on the
basis that the employer was prepared to continue to pay the employee with-
out insisting that the employee perform any services under the contract.
The remarkable aspect of Buckenara and Harding is not so much that
the courts were willing to grant injunctions, but the length of time for
which the restraints were to operate. The overwhelming number of English
cases has resulted in restraining orders (if any) of very short duration.156
The notable exception is Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, where the
restraint could have lasted for up to three years - comparable to the dura-
tion of orders in Buckenara and Harding. However, Nelson concerned the
great actress Bette Davis at the height of her career. Her value to Warner
Bros. measured in terms of her uniqueness as an international star and the
substantial damage the corporation might suffer if she could provide her
talents to a competitor, perhaps justified a lengthy restraint. By that stage
of her career, she was probably a person of substantial wealth and quite
capable of enduring the effect of an injunction for a short period since she
could look forward to a relatively long career. The balance of hardship was
very much in favour of Bette Davis. By contrast, neither Buckenara nor
Harding were superstars of their sport. They were two of many good play-
ers. Indeed, Harding was yet to play in the AFL.157 Buckenara was near-
ing the end of his career and less able to endure the effect of an
injunction.158 Each player appears not to have had substantial independent
wealth. While Hawthorn may have had some difficulty in finding compara-
ble substitute players in the short term, it is hard to maintain that it would
have been irreparably damaged if the injunctions were not granted and that
the balance of hardship was clearly against the club.
Nevertheless, an argument might be made for professional team athletes
such as Buckenara and Harding to be restrained for a maximum of one
season. We foresee at least two difficulties with that argument. First, the
154. These are conveniently collected in Warren v. Mendy, [1989] 3 All E.R. 103.
155. [1987] I.C.R. 588.
156. See Warren v. Mendy, [1989] 3 All E.R. 103.
157. Harding was described by Tadgell as a "potential star attraction," but Harding's career
has proved only moderately successful. Given that predictions about the prospects of "new re-
cruits" in team sports are notoriously unreliable, it may be wiser for courts to avoid having to
weigh the merits of the (self-justifying) predictions of sports administrators by declining to grant
restraining injunctions.
158. This factor, however, contributed to his not being restrained from playing Australian
Rules football in other competitions.
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strong view espoused by the courts has been an unwillingness to, in effect,
compel an employee to specifically perform a personal service contract by
means of the court enforcing a negative covenant that the employee not
work for others. Hence, in Buckenara and Harding the courts were preoc-
cupied with determining whether the professional footballer would have
had other employment opportunities and thereby avoid being idle if re-
strained from playing football for other clubs. This approach by the courts
is quite blinkered. It ignores completely the nature of the elite athlete.
That nature contains an extremely powerful desire to compete and achieve
at the highest level. Within days of the judgments, both Buckenara and
Harding had compromised their differences with Hawthorn and played in
the 1987 VFL season for that club. There is no doubt that the judges' or-
ders were tantamount to directions to play for Hawthorn and this will al-
most inevitably be so in similar cases.
Second, the injunction is an equitable remedy and, as such, is discretion-
ary. A factor indicating against the exercise of the discretion is the availa-
bility and adequacy of alternative remedies. Damages is one alternative.159
The contract measure of damages aims to put the innocent party in the
same position as if performance had been rendered. It can be argued that
any such calculation is speculative in that it is exceedingly difficult to assess
the worth to a sports team of a key position player in terms of the effect of
the players' absence on spectatorship and sponsorship. 16 In some respects,
the elite athlete may be considered unique. However, Australian courts
have not been deterred from endeavouring to calculate damages in compa-
rable circumstances in other contexts or at least from stating that a measure
of damages can be calculated.1 61 The fact that damages may be difficult to
calculate is not a justification for stating that damages are an inadequate
remedy or for favouring the exercise of the discretion. Drawing an analogy
from the prima facie measure of damages for non-delivery of goods, we
suggest that an adequate prima facie measure for the innocent club is the
difference between the amount which the innocent club would have paid
and the amount which the player is to receive from his or her new club.1 62
159. For a recent decision applying Bucknara v. Hawthorn Football Club Ltd., [1988] V.R.
39, but refusing to grant an injunction because, among other things, damages were an adequate
remedy, see Film House Pty. Ltd. v. Silverstein, ACL Rep 165 Vic 1 (1991).
160. E.g., Hawthorn Football Club Ltd. v. Harding, V.R. 49, 60 (1988).
161. E.g., Callaghan v. Wrm C. Lynch Pty. Ltd., N.S.W.R. 871, 877 (1962); Oldcastle v.
Guinea Airways Ltd., S.A.S.R. 325 (1956); Fink v. Fink, 74 C.L.R. 127, 143 (1946) and Howe v.
Teefy, 27 N.S.W.St.R. 301, 307 (1927).
162. Additional amounts could be included, such as the cost of engaging a replacement
player.
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Indeed, this is the player's "market value." '163 Hence, an injunction to re-
strain a breach of a negative covenant ought not to be granted. In this
approach we foresee further advantages. The policy of protecting contrac-
tual bargains is advanced because the player will not be financially ad-
vantaged by breaching his or her bargain. On the other hand, the player is
not at risk of being indirectly forced to continue to play with a club against
his or her will by virtue of the injunction enforcing the negative covenant
and can play elsewhere to satisfy the myriad of reasons that might prompt a
bona fide desire to change clubs; for example, geographical proximity to
family, compatibility with coach and teammates and career advancement.
II. STATUTORY RESTRAINTS ON THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT AND
DUTIES OF THE PARTIES
It has long been recognised that the law of contract wrongly presup-
poses equality of bargaining power between the contracting parties. Ac-
cordingly, significant statutory modifications have been made to the
common law in a variety of forms. The courts also have developed com-
mon law doctrines which recognise potential inequality; for instance,
through principles which will allow contracts to be avoided due to duress or
unconscionability in their formation. 1
Statutory provisions which might provide a player relief from unfair or
unconscionable behaviour by an employer may be divided into two catego-
ries. First, statutes concerning industrial relations. Second, there have
been suggestions from time to time that general provisions aimed at uncon-
scionable conduct in connection with the supply of goods and services in
trade or commerce 165 might be relevant to employment contracts. Such an
application now seems unlikely due to the exclusion of employment con-
tracts from the definition of "services" in such legislation (see above).1 66
Accordingly, we will focus on the industrial relations legislation.
In some States, legislation permits employees to claim that they have
been unfairly dismissed and an appropriate industrial tribunal, if it finds
that the dismissal was unfair, may either reinstate the dismissed employee
or award compensation. In most States, virtually any employee may make
163. See discussion of this notion in a slightly different context in Miles v. Wakefield Metro.
Dist. Council, A.C. 539, 560 (1987) (Templeman, L.).
164. See, eg., PETER HALL, UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS AND ECONOMIC DURESS
(1985).
165. E.g., Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) § 52A and Fair Trading Act 1985 (Vict.) § 1 lA.
166. There may also be difficulties in satisfying the requirement that the conduct occurred "in
trade or commerce;" see Concrete Constructions (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Nelson, 92 A.L.R. 193
(1990), c.f. Barto v. GPR Management Serv. Pty. Ltd., A.T.P.R. 41-162 (1992).
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such a claim; 67 in others the employee must be a member of a union or
have his or her claim brought by a union.16 The latter is also essentially
the position under the federal Industrial Relations Act of 1988. The provi-
sions and the jurisdictional issues surrounding them are complex and it is
not the occasion to discuss them here.169 However, an illustrative example
is Bartlett v. Indian Pacific Limited. 70
Glen Bartlett entered into a contract with the Western Australian Foot-
ball League ("WAFL")17 1 in February 1987 to perform services as a profes-
sional Australian Rules footballer for three years. Under the contract, his
services could be contracted to what was designated "the New Club" (sub-
sequently named the West Coast Eagles) or to any WAFL club. Upon the
formation of the Eagles (which was incorporated as Indian Pacific Ltd.),
Bartlett's services were assigned to that club which included him on its
player list. Such inclusion was a pre-condition to him being selected to
play. He played some games for the Eagles during the 1987 Victorian Foot-
ball League season, but was dropped the following year from the player list
without any warnings that his performance was regarded as unsatisfactory.
Bartlett applied to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Com-
mission alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed and sought, among
other things, reinstatement. In a decision rich in analysis of wide-ranging
issues affecting sports law, Commissioner Fielding found that Bartlett had
not been unfairly dismissed. Importantly, his decision reflects the astute-
ness of industrial tribunals to the realities, customs and practices applying
in industries over which they exercise jurisdiction. The Commissioner
stated that in considering the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal of a
167. See Industrial Relations Act 1991 (N.S.W.) §§ 245-55; Industrial Relations Act 1990
(Queensl.) § 11.11; Industrial Relations Act 1972 (S.Austl.) § 31 and Andrew Stewart, UNFAIR
DISMISSAL IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (1988); Industrial Relations Act 1979 (W.Austl.) §§ 23(1) and
29(b) and M. Brown, The Demise of Compensation as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Western
Australia: A Casualty of the Robe River Dispute, 19 UNI. W.A.L.R. 29 (1989). Between 1983 and
1990, Victoria was essentially an "individual rights" jurisdiction by virtue of Industrial Relations
Act 1979 (Vict.) § 34 (see John Benson et al., The Impact of Unfair Dismissal Legislation in the
Victorian Jurisdiction, 2 AusT. J. OF LAB. L. 141 (1989), but the decision of the High Court of
Australia in Downey v. Trans Waste Pty. Ltd., 99 A.L.R. 402 (1991) has restricted the right to
claim unfair dismissal to employees covered by Victorian industrial awards only.
168. See Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas.), § 29 together with the definition of "industrial
dispute" in § 3(1). See generally A.P. Davidson, Reinstatement of Employees by State Industrial
Tribunals, 54 AUSTL. L.J. 706 (1980).
169. See also MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 359-402, and CREIGHTON & STE\VART,
supra note 13, at 159-70.
170. 68 W.A.I.G. 2508 (1988).
171. In 1987 the WAFL acquired an expansion franchise in the Victorian Football League
(now the Australian Football League). The WAFL continues to conduct its Perth-based competi-
tion among its member clubs but the best players compete in the AFL for the WAFL.
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professional team athlete, it has to be accepted that the future of their em-
ployment has a degree of uncertainty which other vocations do not possess.
Public support for a club, and subsequently the commercial revenue at-
tracted to the club, depends on success in competition. Difficult selection
decisions therefore must be made and it is "very much the part of a profes-
sional sportsman's lot to be subject to the vagaries of team coaches and
selectors." '172 Thus, the Commissioner concluded:
In this case the evidence is that the decision to dismiss the Applicant
was made after a review of his playing performances and after un-
dergoing various trials. The decision was based on performance, or
perceived lack of it, by those who one would ordinarily expect to
make such decisions for the West Coast Eagles and I cannot think
that this was either an unreasonable or irrational approach. [I]t is
not the Commission's function in claims of unfair dismissal to put
itself in the position of the manager of the business and to determine
the fairness or otherwise of a dismissal on the basis of what it would
have done had it been the manager or team selector. Rather, its
function is to determine fairness on the basis of an objective standard
of reasonableness. It would be intolerable if every time a footballer
was not selected in a team, or for inclusion in a playing squad, he
could come to the Industrial Relations Commission to overcome the
vagaries of the particular coach or selection committee. The Com-
mission is simply not qualified to act as a selector in that way. I
have been unable to find any instances of industrial laws relating to
unfair dismissals having extended into the area of sporting team se-
lections to the extent that the Applicant suggests it should on this
occasion and I would be surprised if it did. It may be that different
considerations might apply in cases involving dismissals unrelated to
player performances. 173
In New South Wales, professional athletes can also rely upon Section
88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (N.S.W.). Section 88F provides:
88F. (1) The Commission may make an order or award declaring
void in whole or in part or varying in whole or in part
and either ab initio or from some other time any contract
or arrangement or any condition or collateral arrange-
ment relating thereto whereby a person performs work in
any industry on the grounds that the contract or arrange-
ment or any condition or collateral arrangement relating
thereto -
(a) is unfair, or
172. Id. at 2517.
173. Id. at 2157-58.
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(b) is harsh or unconscionable, or
(c) is against the public interest. Without limiting the
generality of the words "public interest" regard shall
be had in considering the question of public interest
to the effect such a contract or a series of such con-
tracts has had or may have on any system of appren-
ticeship and other methods of providing a sufficient
and trained labour force, or ....
In Sulkowicz v. Paramatta District Rugby League Club Ltd.,74 Justice
Sweeney held that a professional rugby league player came within the New
South Wales Industrial Commission's jurisdiction under this section. He
held further that the player's contract with the Club was unfair and "very
one-sided in favour of the Club and against the player." '175 The Club was
entitled under the contract to in effect terminate it at any time by not "grad-
ing" Sulkowicz. That, together with the circumstance that Sulkowicz had
not been given notice of this entitlement during particular negotiations,
prompted Sweeney to declare the contract void and to order the Club to
pay to the player $13,000. Although not expressly mentioned, it is perhaps
significant that Sulkowicz would have otherwise undertaken a substantial
amount of pre-season training without payment.
In Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd.,176 the relationship
between Section 88F and the common law doctrine of restraint of trade was
considered briefly. Justice Hill concluded (at the trial) that as a general
proposition if the player draft did not contravene the common law doctrine
because it was a reasonable restraint, it would not run foul of Section 88F
on the basis of it being unfair. 77 But as the Full Court of the Federal Court
pointed out,17 8 Section 88F could not in any event apply to the draft rules
because they affected a player only at the expiration of his contract. It is
only the terms of the player contract during its subsistence which attract
the operation of the section. Since evidence on that aspect had not been
adduced in regard to the actual effect on individual players, no conclusion
could be reached in relation to the section's application.
III. COLLECTIVE LABOUR RELATIONS AND SPORTS LAW
In our introduction we remarked upon the trend toward collective or-
ganisation and collective bargaining in professional team sports in Austra-
174. 4 I.R. 272 (1983).
175. Id. at 278.
176. 31 F.C.R. 242 (1991) (Austl.).
177. He regarded "unfairness" as a wider concept than "harshness" or "unconscionability."
178. 31 F.C.R. 242, 264 (1991) Wilcox J. (Sheppard and Gummon J., agreeing).
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lia. We have also made reference to the introduction, in recent years, of
standard form player contracts and how this has tended to provide a focus
for the common industrial interests of team athletes. What is surprising is
that professional team sports have taken so long to enter the mainstream
industrial relations system, especially when Australia has a comparatively
high rate of unionism and a high-profile industrial relations system.17 9
In Australia, sports unionism is a comparatively recent phenomenon.18
Indeed, in most sports representative associations are not formally regis-
tered under industrial relations legislation. Industrial award coverage
(which is the formal outcome of bargaining within the institutional system
of industrial relations) of sports players is also largely unknown. It is inter-
esting to note that similar professions such as actors and musicians have
been unionised and have had award coverage for many years. Why has
sport remained outside the institutional industrial relations system? Part of
the answer may be found in decisions of the High Court of Australia about
the kinds of occupations which can be unionised and thus participate in the
federal industrial relations system. Until its repeal in 1988, the Conciliation
and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) 181 provided in Section 132 that only as-
sociations of employees whose members were either employed "in or in con-
nection with any industry" or who were "engaged in an industrial pursuit"
could register as federal trade unions. The concept of an "industry" or an
"industrial pursuit" derived in part from the High Court's interpretation of
Section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution. Section 5 1(xxxv) provides
that the federal Parliament may make laws with respect to:
5 1(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settle-
ment of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of
any one State.
179. As to some of the reasons why not, see Braham Dabscheck, Standard Player Contracts
and Collective Bargaining, paper presented on May 18, 1991 to The Law of Professional Team
Sports Conference conducted by the Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Association Inc.
and The University of Melbourne Law School Continuing Education Program, subsequently pub-
lished as Unions and Sport: Australian Professional Players' Associations, 2 ECON. & LAB. REL.
REv. 114 (1991). There is, however, little doubt that the union movement has now discovered
professional team sports as area for industrial organisation: Kate Halfpenny, When Good Sports
Rex Industrial Muscle, WORKPLACE, 6 Winter 1991.
For a good general treatment of the regulation of trade unions in Australia, see CREIGHTON &
STEWART, supra note 13, at 159-214.
180. Though perhaps more extensive than has been believed, see Dabscheck, supra note 179.
See also Braham Dabscheck, The Professional Cricketers Association of Australia, 8 SPORTING
TRADITIONS 2 (1991).
181. In 1988, this Act was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth).
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The High Court held in a long series of decisions 182 that this constitu-
tional power with respect to industrial disputes was confined to disputes
about industrial matters in an industry. Thus, unless the employee's occu-
pation was inherently industrial or the employer's business was industrial in
nature, a representative association of employees could not register as a fed-
eral union and consequently obtain industrial award protection for its mem-
bers. In 1955, a group of Australian Rules footballers in Victoria formed
the Australian Football Players' Union and applied for registration as a
federal trade union under the predecessor to Section 132 of the Conciliation
and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The Union met all of the formal require-
ments of federal registration in that it consisted of an association of more
than 100 persons and its members had agreed upon an appropriate set of
rules. However, the application for registration was refused by the Federal
Industrial Registrar 83 on two grounds. In the first place, the Registrar
found that a significant number of the Union's members might not be em-
ployees in an industry. He accepted arguments on behalf of the VFL, the
Victorian Football Association and Essendon Football Club that many of
the Union's members could be amateurs, perhaps in the sense that although
they were paid to play football games this was really a hobby or an aside
from their main employment elsewhere.1 84 Once again we see the sports
mystique rearing its head. The other ground for the Registrar's refusal of
registration was his finding that VFL football was not an "industry" and his
implied acceptance of an argument "that the mere playing of a sport,
whether for remuneration or otherwise, is not in itself an industrial activ-
ity." This is perhaps a less surprising finding given that the commercialisa-
tion of VFL football was at that stage embryonic.
The result of this decision was that the Australian Football Players'
Union remained an unincorporated association without any industrial sta-
tus. It was unable to achieve any award protection for its members and it
disbanded in 1956. Not until 1973 was the VFL Players' Association
formed (now named the AFL Players' Association) and only recently has it
considered the possibility of a renewed attempt to become a federal trade
union. 185
Apart from federal registration as a trade union, employee associations
may achieve industrial registration under State industrial legislation. Be-
182. See MCCALLUM et al., supra note 52, at 167-235.
183. 84 C.A.R. 675 (1956).
184. It is also likely that some of the members were not paid at all, but it is not possible to
ascertain whether this was so from the report of the decision.
185. It might have been able to have gained recognition under Victorian industrial relations
legislation, but seems not to have pursued that path.
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cause State legislation is not constrained by the limitations of section
51(xxxv) of the Constitution, it is surprising that associations of sports per-
sons have not followed this course until very recently. However, change
has begun. In 1980, the Association of Rugby League Professionals in New
South Wales registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Act 1881
(N.S.W.), and in 1984 it registered under section 8 of the Industrial Arbi-
tration Act 1940 (N.S.W.). The Association changed its name to the Rugby
League Players Union in 1991 and has also affiliated with the Labour Coun-
cil of New South Wales."8 6
Despite the 1956 decision of the Federal Industrial Registrar concerning
an Australian rules players' union registration application, it is now almost
certain that an association of professional sports players could, apart from
some practical considerations (see below), gain federal registration as a
trade union. This is largely a result of the landmark Social Welfare Union
case in 1983,187 where the High Court adopted a very broad view as to what
constitutes an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 51(xxxv)
of the Constitution, and of the capacity of associations of employees to reg-
ister.188 However, a number of practical difficulties stand in the way of the
registration of a players' union in its own right. In the first place, amend-
ments to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) in early 1991 impose a
requirement that an association of employees seeking registration have
10,000 or more members. It seems unlikely that a team sports union could
achieve this figure, even if it was an amalgamation of players from all major
professional team sports. The other difficulty is that paragraph 189(1)(j) of
the Industrial Relations Act requires the designated Presidential Member
(who has replaced the Federal Industrial Registrar as the relevant decision-
maker regarding registration) to grant an application for registration only if
"there is no organisation to which the members of the association might
conveniently belong."
In order to understand the operation of this provision, it is necessary to
explain the registration mechanism. A registered union must have among
its rules (which are rather like a club constitution) a rule known as an eligi-
bility rule. This rule will prescribe the occupations and industries in which
the union can legitimately recruit members. Thus, if a registered union has
an eligibility rule covering members of an association seeking registration, it
can object to the latter's application for registration. The grounds for objec-
186. See Braham Dabscheck, Unions and Sport: Australian Professional Players' Associations,
2 THE ECONOMIC AND LABOUR RELATIONS REVIEW 114, 120-21 (1991).
187. R. v. Coldham; ex parte Austl. Social Welfare Union, 153 C.L.R. 297 (1983) (Austl.).
188. In this respect, see also R. v. Lee; ex parte Harper, 160 C.L.R. 430 (1986) (Austl.).
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tion would be that members of the applying association could more conve-
niently belong to the registered union. It is also important to appreciate
that principles developed by the High Court of Australia ensure that eligi-
bility rules are interpreted broadly and in a non-technical manner.189
As far as professional team sports are concerned, two existing federally
registered unions appear to have coverage of their players. The Theatrical
and Amusement Employees' Association has a registered eligibility rule
which provides that the following employees are eligible to join it:
Employees employed in or in connection with, including selling tick-
ets by any means in connection therewith, or in or about, any kind of
amusements, whether indoor or outdoor, including:
(a) cultural complexes, theatres, cinemas, halls, racecourses, sports,
exhibitions. 190
The other union which has coverage is Actors' Equity. Its eligibility rule
provides that it has coverage of persons employed -
... for the purpose of commercial display in... the entertainment
industry or in any other place which could reasonably be construed
to be a place of entertainment ....
A professional team sports association could seek to form a branch of
one of these two unions rather than attempt the arduous and doubtful
course of seeking registration in its own right. The rules of either registered
union could quite easily be changed to accommodate a largely autonomous
sub-branch of professional sports players, perhaps with its own organiser
and management committee. It is quite common for trade unions to create
this kind of arrangement to satisfy the special interests of particular classes
of their membership.
What would be the benefits to players and their associations of being a
registered trade union or a member of such a union? They would include:
1. Terms and conditions of employment presently contained in
player contracts could be included in a binding industrial award
enforceable under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act
1988 (Cth)' 9 1 or State industrial relations legislation.
2. In some States (see above) and in the federal industrial relations
jurisdiction, registration would give members the right to seek
remedies for unfair dismissal. It should be emphasised that the
189. See, e.g., R. v. Cohen; ex parte Motor Accidents Bd. (Tasmania), 141 C.L.R. 577, 587
(1979) (Mason, J.).
190. See Neil v. Austl. Theatrical and Amusement Employees' Ass'n, 50 A.L.J.R. 499 (1976),
which seems to indicate that sports players directly employed in "an amusement" would come
within this eligibility rule.
191. CREIGHTON & STEWART, supra note 13, at 87-88.
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unfair dismissal jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals is wider
and less expensive (to the parties) than comparable remedies
and proceedings in the courts (for instance, for actions for
wrongful dismissal).
3. In the event that sports administrators refuse to negotiate with
players' associations, grievances and claims can be taken to con-
ciliation and arbitration. The industrial tribunals can call com-
pulsory conferences between the parties and ultimately can
arbitrate on their differences. An arbitral award will bind the
employer(s).
4. Victimisation of players on the grounds of their union member-
ship or activities is an offence.192 Moreover, most awards give
unions, and union officials, access to workplaces for the pur-
poses of recruitment - even though there may be no union
members present - or to hold union meetings.
However, not all the benefits flow to the players and their associations.
Employers, too, stand to gain by securing access to formal dispute resolu-
tion procedures. Registration of one player union would also prevent "po-
tentially" disruptive splinter groups having any legal or industrial relations
status. Finally, there is the possibility that the instability experienced
through the restraint of trade doctrine could be resolved once and for all by
the inclusion of restrictive practices, such as player draft and salary cap
provisions, in registered industrial agreements (see below).
A. Enterprise Bargaining
As sports industrial relations moves closer to the mainstream institu-
tional industrial relations system, it will inevitably become entangled in the
shift toward enterprise bargaining. It is difficult to be precise about the
term "enterprise bargaining" - after all, the Australian Council of Trade
Unions, employer bodies, Government and the Industrial Relations Com-
mission cannot agree on what it means - but it is possible to paint the
following tentative picture.
It is likely that existing industrial tribunals will continue to set mini-
mum terms and conditions of employment on an industry-wide basis
through what are known as "industry awards" and they will retain their
unfair dismissal jurisdictions. However, enterprises will be able to negotiate
with enterprise bargaining units (which may or may not be part of existing
industry or occupational unions) about wages and conditions applying in
the enterprise. The enterprise agreements reached might include arrange-
192. Id. at 212-14.
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ments at variance with the industry award. 193 In some scenarios, enterprise
agreements may contain terms inferior to the industry award. 194 Enterprise
agreements will, in any event, be accorded the same legal status as an
award. That is, they will be a form of "quasi-legislation". They will derive
their legal force from the relevant industrial relations legislation even
though they may at the same time be contracts between the parties to them.
The implications for sports industrial relations are monumental. It is
likely that the enterprise for the purposes of sports enterprise bargaining
will be the sporting association rather than the individual club. As the
Business Council of Australia has argued in its influential study, Enterprise-
Based Bargaining Units - A Better Way of Working,195 "enterprises are de-
fined by customers and markets." Clearly, sporting associations such as the
AFL, NSWRL, National Basketball League, Australian Cricket Board and
National Soccer League are competing with each other in a "sports mar-
ket" for audiences, sponsorships, advertising and television and radio cover-
age. While there is undoubtedly competition among clubs within these
sports, the centralisation of administration and planning, gate and television
receipts equalisation schemes, the growth of national leagues and control
devices such as player drafts and salary caps point to the leagues and not
the individual clubs as the enterprises. Clubs in many respects are operat-
ing divisions of the leagues.
Thus, the enterprise bargaining will be between the leagues or sports
associations on one hand and player associations on the other. The legal
status likely to be accorded to enterprise "bargaining-units" also offers op-
portunities to player associations. It may become unnecessary to form, or
become part of, a federally registered union. On the other hand, even if
they become sub-branches of federal unions the status as an enterprise bar-
gaining unit may offer guarantees of autonomy.
The final and perhaps more speculative implication we see arising from
enterprise bargaining is the possibility of including arrangements such as
salary caps and player drafts in enterprise agreements. We should also
point out for completeness that this possibility may already exist under the
certified agreements provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1988
193. This is now the case under the Industrial Relations Commission's "enterprise bargaining
principle." See National Wage Case, Print K0300, October 1991.
194. As seems to be the case under the enterprise agreement provisions of the recent Indus-
trial Relations Act 1991 (N.S.W.), see Part 3 Div. 2.
195. Business Council of Australia, (1989).
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(Cth).1 96 The High Court of Australia has held that an employer's recruit-
ment and staffing practices may be the subject of an industrial award or
agreement 97 and, by analogy, player drafts and salary caps may be able to
be included in enterprise agreements or certified agreements. The advan-
tages for sports administrators would be considerable. The legislative status
accorded to enterprise or certified agreements would put restrictive arrange-
ments such as player drafts and salary caps beyond the reach of the com-
mon law restraint of trade doctrine - a doctrine blamed for creating
instability in the administration of professional team sports for the past 30
years. Further, such arrangements would, in our view, be more clearly be-
yond the reach of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act (Cth).
CONCLUSION
In the sense described in this paper, individualism in professional team
sports is withering. If not completely dead, the individual autonomy of
clubs and players has been severely eroded. In its place is the new collectiv-
ism. Perhaps the managements of sports leagues have been quicker to grasp
its possibilities than the players, but there are growing indications that play-
ers' associations are looking to the processes of collective bargaining. None
of this is necessarily a bad thing. It reflects the maturing of elite team sport
as a form of commercial activity, distinctive in its culture and in the emo-
tional responses it evokes in society - but, nevertheless, part of the main-
stream of the world of commerce and industry. As such, it is now merely
attracting the legal responses applying to the broader community. In that
sense, elite team sport has grown up, but is it still "sport"? 198
196. See § 115. For analysis of this section see Ronald McCallum, Collective Bargaining Aus-
tralian Style: the Making of Section 115 Agreements Under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth),
3 AusT. J. OF LAB. L. 211 (1990).
197. Re Cram; ex parte N.S.W. Colliery Proprietors Ass'n Ltd., 163 C.L.R. 117 (1987)
(Austl.).
198. Further reading: (1) John Adam, Representing Player Interests in Professional Team
Sports, PROCEEDINGS OF SPORT AND THE LAW WORKSHOP, LAUNCESTON (June 17, 1989, Cen-
tre for Commercial Law and Applied Legal Research, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria).
(2) Jeffrey M. Browne, Recent Developments in Player Contracts in SPORT AND THE LAW (1985,
Centre for Commercial Law and Applied Legal Research, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria).
(3) Jeffrey M. Browne, Playing Contracts and Pitfalls in SPORTS AND THE LAW (1991, Business
Law Education Centre, Melbourne). (4) Alan Golberg and Brian Ward, Players' Contracts and
Collective Bargaining in SPORTS AND THE LAW (1980, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Clay-
ton, Victoria). (5) Greg Griffin, Life in the A.F.L. 'Days of Swine and Roses" 12 LAW SOCIETY
BULLETIN 132 (1990). (6) Kevin Lindgren, Sport and the Law, The Player's Contract, 4 JOUR-
NAL OF CONTRACT LAW 135 (1991). (7) Macve McDonagh, Restrictive Provisions in Player
Agreements, 4 AUSTL. J. OF LAB. L. 126 (1991). (8) Brian Ward, Player Service Contracts in
SPORTING LAW (BLEC Books, 1989, Melbourne).
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